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Phase 1 - Licensing & Compliance: - Add MIT LICENSE file - Add copyright headers to server/index.js, poller.js, config.js, sanitizeError.js, and new loadSecrets.js Phase 2 - Security Hardening: - Add server/utils/loadSecrets.js: Docker secrets support via _FILE env var pattern (COOKIE_SECRET_FILE, EMBY_API_KEY_FILE, etc.) - Add SSRF/URL validation in config.js: validates all configured service instance URLs for scheme and well-formedness at startup - Add SIGTERM/SIGINT graceful shutdown: stops poller, drains HTTP connections, 10s force-exit fallback - Warn at startup if COOKIE_SECRET is shorter than 32 characters - Validate EMBY_URL scheme at startup - Improve sanitizeError: redact host:port from axios error URLs while preserving path/query for other redaction patterns Phase 3 - Config Robustness: - Weak COOKIE_SECRET warning (< 32 chars) - EMBY_URL validated via validateInstanceUrl on startup Phase 4 - Docker & Deployment: - .dockerignore: add tests/, coverage/, vitest.config.js, CHANGELOG.md, SECURITY.md, LICENSE, .markdownlint.json - docker-compose.yaml: add commented Option B (Docker secrets _FILE pattern) alongside existing plain-env Option A Phase 5 - Docs & Release Readiness: - Add CHANGELOG.md with entries from v1.0.0 to v1.2.0 - Update SECURITY.md: supported versions table, fix Docker secrets note to reflect _FILE support now implemented - Add public/.well-known/security.txt for responsible disclosure - Bump version to 1.2.0
156 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
156 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy & Hardening Guide
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## Supported Versions
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| Version | Supported |
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|---------|-----------|
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| 1.2.x | ✅ Yes |
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| 1.1.x | ✅ Yes |
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| 1.0.x | ❌ No |
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| < 1.0 | ❌ No |
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## Reporting a Vulnerability
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Please **do not** open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
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Email: gordon@i3omb.com — expect acknowledgement within 48 hours.
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---
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## Threat Model
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sofarr is a personal dashboard intended for a small trusted group (household/team).
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It proxies requests to *arr stack services using stored API keys and authenticates
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users via Emby. The primary threat surface when exposed to the public internet:
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| Threat | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|
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| Credential brute-force | Rate limiting (10 fails/15 min per IP), account lockout window |
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| Session hijacking | HMAC-signed cookies, `httpOnly`, `secure`, `sameSite=strict`, short TTL |
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| CSRF | Double-submit cookie pattern (`X-CSRF-Token` header required on all mutations) |
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| API key leakage via errors | `sanitizeError()` redacts keys/tokens from all error responses and logs |
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| Token theft after logout | Server-side token store; Emby token revoked on logout |
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| XSS → token theft | `httpOnly` cookies; CSP with per-request nonce blocks inline injection |
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| Clickjacking | `X-Frame-Options: DENY` + CSP `frame-ancestors 'none'` |
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| Info disclosure via headers | Helmet v7 removes `X-Powered-By`, sets `noSniff`, `xssFilter`, etc. |
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| Privilege escalation (container) | Non-root user (UID 1000), `no-new-privileges`, all caps dropped |
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| Unbounded log growth | Size-based rotation: 10 MB cap, 3 rotated files kept |
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| Dependency vulnerabilities | `npm audit --audit-level=high` in CI on every push |
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---
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## Production Deployment Checklist
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### Required
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- [ ] `COOKIE_SECRET` set to a random 32-byte hex string (`openssl rand -hex 32`)
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- [ ] `NODE_ENV=production`
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- [ ] `TRUST_PROXY=1` set if behind a reverse proxy
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- [ ] sofarr bound to `127.0.0.1` only (not `0.0.0.0`) — expose via proxy
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- [ ] HTTPS enforced by the reverse proxy with a valid certificate
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- [ ] Firewall rules: only 443/80 open externally; 3001 not directly exposed
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### Recommended
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- [ ] Reverse proxy: Nginx, Caddy, or Traefik with TLS termination
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- [ ] Set `Strict-Transport-Security` at proxy level (sofarr also sends HSTS)
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- [ ] `DATA_DIR` on a named Docker volume (not bind-mounted to sensitive host path)
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- [ ] Rotate `COOKIE_SECRET` periodically (causes all users to re-login)
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- [ ] Enable Docker's `--read-only` flag (already in `docker-compose.yaml`)
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- [ ] Monitor `/health` endpoint with an uptime checker
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### Docker Secrets (alternative to env vars)
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For production environments that support Docker secrets, you can mount secret
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files and reference them:
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```yaml
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secrets:
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cookie_secret:
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file: ./secrets/cookie_secret.txt
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emby_api_key:
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file: ./secrets/emby_api_key.txt
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services:
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sofarr:
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secrets:
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- cookie_secret
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- emby_api_key
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environment:
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- COOKIE_SECRET_FILE=/run/secrets/cookie_secret
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- EMBY_API_KEY_FILE=/run/secrets/emby_api_key
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```
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> Since v1.2.0, sofarr natively supports the `_FILE` pattern.
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> Set `COOKIE_SECRET_FILE=/run/secrets/cookie_secret` and sofarr will
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> read the secret value from that file at startup. See `docker-compose.yaml`
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> for a complete example.
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---
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## Reverse Proxy Example (Caddy)
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```caddy
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sofarr.example.com {
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reverse_proxy localhost:3001
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header {
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Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
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X-Robots-Tag "noindex, nofollow"
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}
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}
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```
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## Reverse Proxy Example (Nginx)
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```nginx
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server {
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listen 443 ssl;
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server_name sofarr.example.com;
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ssl_certificate /etc/letsencrypt/live/sofarr.example.com/fullchain.pem;
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ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/sofarr.example.com/privkey.pem;
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location / {
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proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3001;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
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# Required for SSE (Server-Sent Events) — disable response buffering
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proxy_buffering off;
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proxy_cache off;
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proxy_read_timeout 3600s;
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}
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}
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```
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---
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## Security Headers (emitted by sofarr)
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| Header | Value |
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|--------|-------|
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| `Content-Security-Policy` | `default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-…'; style-src 'self' 'nonce-…'; style-src-attr 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'` |
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| `Strict-Transport-Security` | `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload` (production only) |
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| `X-Content-Type-Options` | `nosniff` |
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| `X-Frame-Options` | `DENY` |
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| `Referrer-Policy` | `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` |
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| `Permissions-Policy` | `camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()` |
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---
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## Rate Limits
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| Endpoint | Limit |
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|----------|-------|
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| `POST /api/auth/login` | 10 failed attempts per 15 min per IP |
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| All `/api/*` routes | 300 requests per 15 min per IP |
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---
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## Supply Chain
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- All dependencies pinned to minor version ranges in `package.json`
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- `npm audit --audit-level=high` runs in CI on every push and pull request
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- `npm audit fix` should be run when vulnerabilities are reported
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