chore: merge develop into main for v0.2.0 release

2026-05-17 08:12:31 +01:00
parent 8eb49f64b6 55e4aedfca
commit 80a6d559c9
34 changed files with 4318 additions and 1428 deletions
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -6,6 +6,15 @@ LOG_LEVEL=info
 # Required in production. Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
 COOKIE_SECRET=your_cookie_secret_here

+# Set to 1 (or a specific IP/CIDR) when running behind a reverse proxy
+# (Nginx, Caddy, Traefik) so Express trusts X-Forwarded-For/Proto.
+# Leave unset if sofarr is exposed directly.
+# TRUST_PROXY=1
+
+# Directory for persistent data (SQLite token store + logs)
+# Defaults to ./data relative to project root
+# DATA_DIR=/app/data
+
 # Background polling interval in ms (default: 5000)
 # Set to 0 or "off" to disable and fetch on-demand instead
 # POLL_INTERVAL=5000
--- a/.env.sample
+++ b/.env.sample
@@ -19,6 +19,21 @@ LOG_LEVEL=info
 # Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
 COOKIE_SECRET=your-cookie-secret-here

+# =============================================================================
+# REVERSE PROXY & DEPLOYMENT
+# =============================================================================
+
+# Set to 1 when running behind a reverse proxy (Nginx, Caddy, Traefik).
+# This makes Express trust X-Forwarded-For and X-Forwarded-Proto so that
+# req.ip reflects the real client IP and cookies are marked secure correctly.
+# Leave unset if sofarr is exposed directly to the internet.
+# TRUST_PROXY=1
+
+# Directory for persistent data (SQLite token store, server logs).
+# Must be writable by the process user (UID 1000 in the container).
+# Defaults to ./data relative to the project root.
+# DATA_DIR=/app/data
+
 # Background polling interval in milliseconds (default: 5000)
 # sofarr polls all services in the background and caches results so
 # dashboard requests are near-instant.
--- a/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ on:

 jobs:
  audit:
-    name: npm audit
+    name: Security audit
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -16,11 +16,47 @@ jobs:
      - name: Set up Node.js
        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
        with:
-          node-version: "18"
+          node-version: "22"
          cache: "npm"

      - name: Install dependencies
        run: npm ci

-      - name: Run security audit
-        run: npm audit --audit-level=moderate
+      - name: Run security audit (fail on high+)
+        run: npm audit --audit-level=high
+
+      - name: Check for critical vulnerabilities
+        run: npm audit --audit-level=critical --json | jq -e '.metadata.vulnerabilities.critical == 0' || (echo "Critical vulnerabilities found!" && exit 1)
+        continue-on-error: false
+
+  test:
+    name: Tests & coverage
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Set up Node.js
+        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: "22"
+          cache: "npm"
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: npm ci
+
+      - name: Run tests with coverage
+        run: npm run test:coverage
+        env:
+          # Required by tokenStore (writable temp dir in CI)
+          DATA_DIR: /tmp/sofarr-ci-data
+          # Disable rate limiters so integration tests don't hit 429s
+          SKIP_RATE_LIMIT: "1"
+          NODE_ENV: test
+
+      - name: Upload coverage report
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        if: always()
+        with:
+          name: coverage-report
+          path: coverage/
+          retention-days: 14
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@
 node_modules/
+coverage/
 .env
 dist/
 build/
 .DS_Store
 *.log
 **/*.log
+data/
+*.db
+*.db-wal
+*.db-shm
--- a/43
+++ b/43
@@ -1,4 +1,18 @@
-FROM node:18-alpine
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Stage 1 — deps: install production dependencies only
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM node:22-alpine AS deps
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+# All dependencies are pure JavaScript — no native addons, no build tools.
+COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
+RUN npm ci --omit=dev
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Stage 2 — runtime image (minimal attack surface)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM node:22-alpine AS runtime

 LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="sofarr"
 LABEL org.opencontainers.image.description="Personal media download dashboard for *arr services"
@@ -9,18 +23,31 @@ LABEL org.opencontainers.image.vendor="Gordon Bolton"
 LABEL org.opencontainers.image.licenses="MIT"
 LABEL custom.hardware.requirement="None - runs on any Docker-supported platform including ARM and x86_64"

+# Use the built-in non-root 'node' user (UID 1000) from the official image
+# The /app directory is owned by root; data directory is owned by node
 WORKDIR /app

-# Copy package files and install dependencies
-COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
-RUN npm ci --omit=dev
+# Copy production deps from deps stage
+COPY --from=deps /app/node_modules ./node_modules

-# Copy application source
-COPY server/ ./server/
-COPY public/ ./public/
+# Copy application source owned by root (read-only at runtime)
+COPY --chown=root:root server/ ./server/
+COPY --chown=root:root public/ ./public/
+COPY --chown=root:root package.json ./
+
+# Persistent data directory owned by node user (token store, logs)
+RUN mkdir -p /app/data && chown node:node /app/data
+
+ENV NODE_ENV=production
+ENV DATA_DIR=/app/data
+
+# Drop to non-root user for all subsequent operations
+USER node

 EXPOSE 3001

-ENV NODE_ENV=production
+# HEALTHCHECK — Docker will restart the container if this fails 3 times
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
+  CMD wget -qO- http://localhost:3001/health || exit 1

 CMD ["node", "server/index.js"]
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -308,6 +308,17 @@ Logs are written to both console and `server.log` file.
 - Check qBittorrent Web UI is enabled
 - Verify the URL includes the full path (e.g., `https://qb.example.com`)

+## Testing
+
+```bash
+npm test                # run all tests once
+npm run test:watch      # watch mode
+npm run test:coverage   # with V8 coverage report (outputs to coverage/)
+npm run test:ui         # interactive Vitest UI
+```
+
+115 tests across 8 test files covering the security-critical paths: auth middleware, CSRF protection, secret sanitization, config parsing, token store, and qBittorrent utilities. See [`tests/README.md`](tests/README.md) for design decisions and coverage targets.
+
 ## Development

 ```bash
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+# Security Policy & Hardening Guide
+
+## Supported Versions
+
+| Version | Supported |
+|---------|-----------|
+| 0.2.x   | ✅ Yes    |
+| 0.1.x   | ❌ No     |
+
+## Reporting a Vulnerability
+
+Please **do not** open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
+Email: gordon@i3omb.com — expect acknowledgement within 48 hours.
+
+---
+
+## Threat Model
+
+sofarr is a personal dashboard intended for a small trusted group (household/team).
+It proxies requests to *arr stack services using stored API keys and authenticates
+users via Emby. The primary threat surface when exposed to the public internet:
+
+| Threat | Mitigations |
+|--------|-------------|
+| Credential brute-force | Rate limiting (10 fails/15 min per IP), account lockout window |
+| Session hijacking | HMAC-signed cookies, `httpOnly`, `secure`, `sameSite=strict`, short TTL |
+| CSRF | Double-submit cookie pattern (`X-CSRF-Token` header required on all mutations) |
+| API key leakage via errors | `sanitizeError()` redacts keys/tokens from all error responses and logs |
+| Token theft after logout | Server-side token store; Emby token revoked on logout |
+| XSS → token theft | `httpOnly` cookies; CSP with per-request nonce blocks inline injection |
+| Clickjacking | `X-Frame-Options: DENY` + CSP `frame-ancestors 'none'` |
+| Info disclosure via headers | Helmet v7 removes `X-Powered-By`, sets `noSniff`, `xssFilter`, etc. |
+| Privilege escalation (container) | Non-root user (UID 1000), `no-new-privileges`, all caps dropped |
+| Unbounded log growth | Size-based rotation: 10 MB cap, 3 rotated files kept |
+| Dependency vulnerabilities | `npm audit --audit-level=high` in CI on every push |
+
+---
+
+## Production Deployment Checklist
+
+### Required
+
+- [ ] `COOKIE_SECRET` set to a random 32-byte hex string (`openssl rand -hex 32`)
+- [ ] `NODE_ENV=production`
+- [ ] `TRUST_PROXY=1` set if behind a reverse proxy
+- [ ] sofarr bound to `127.0.0.1` only (not `0.0.0.0`) — expose via proxy
+- [ ] HTTPS enforced by the reverse proxy with a valid certificate
+- [ ] Firewall rules: only 443/80 open externally; 3001 not directly exposed
+
+### Recommended
+
+- [ ] Reverse proxy: Nginx, Caddy, or Traefik with TLS termination
+- [ ] Set `Strict-Transport-Security` at proxy level (sofarr also sends HSTS)
+- [ ] `DATA_DIR` on a named Docker volume (not bind-mounted to sensitive host path)
+- [ ] Rotate `COOKIE_SECRET` periodically (causes all users to re-login)
+- [ ] Enable Docker's `--read-only` flag (already in `docker-compose.yaml`)
+- [ ] Monitor `/health` endpoint with an uptime checker
+
+### Docker Secrets (alternative to env vars)
+
+For production environments that support Docker secrets, you can mount secret
+files and reference them:
+
+```yaml
+secrets:
+  cookie_secret:
+    file: ./secrets/cookie_secret.txt
+  emby_api_key:
+    file: ./secrets/emby_api_key.txt
+
+services:
+  sofarr:
+    secrets:
+      - cookie_secret
+      - emby_api_key
+    environment:
+      - COOKIE_SECRET_FILE=/run/secrets/cookie_secret
+      - EMBY_API_KEY_FILE=/run/secrets/emby_api_key
+```
+
+> Note: File-based secret loading requires application code support.
+> Currently sofarr reads secrets from environment variables only.
+> Mounting secrets as env vars (via `environment:` in compose) is the
+> current supported approach.
+
+---
+
+## Reverse Proxy Example (Caddy)
+
+```caddy
+sofarr.example.com {
+    reverse_proxy localhost:3001
+    header {
+        Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
+        X-Robots-Tag "noindex, nofollow"
+    }
+}
+```
+
+## Reverse Proxy Example (Nginx)
+
+```nginx
+server {
+    listen 443 ssl;
+    server_name sofarr.example.com;
+
+    ssl_certificate     /etc/letsencrypt/live/sofarr.example.com/fullchain.pem;
+    ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/sofarr.example.com/privkey.pem;
+
+    location / {
+        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3001;
+        proxy_set_header Host $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+    }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Security Headers (emitted by sofarr)
+
+| Header | Value |
+|--------|-------|
+| `Content-Security-Policy` | `default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-…'; style-src 'self' 'nonce-…'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'` |
+| `Strict-Transport-Security` | `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload` (production only) |
+| `X-Content-Type-Options` | `nosniff` |
+| `X-Frame-Options` | `DENY` |
+| `Referrer-Policy` | `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` |
+| `Permissions-Policy` | `camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()` |
+
+---
+
+## Rate Limits
+
+| Endpoint | Limit |
+|----------|-------|
+| `POST /api/auth/login` | 10 failed attempts per 15 min per IP |
+| All `/api/*` routes | 300 requests per 15 min per IP |
+
+---
+
+## Supply Chain
+
+- All dependencies pinned to minor version ranges in `package.json`
+- `npm audit --audit-level=high` runs in CI on every push and pull request
+- `npm audit fix` should be run when vulnerabilities are reported
--- a/docker-compose.yaml
+++ b/docker-compose.yaml
@@ -1,17 +1,45 @@
-version: "3"
 services:
  sofarr:
    image: docker.i3omb.com/sofarr:latest
    container_name: sofarr
    restart: unless-stopped
    ports:
-      - "3001:3001"
+      - "127.0.0.1:3001:3001"   # bind to loopback only — expose via reverse proxy
    environment:
      - PORT=3001
+      - NODE_ENV=production
+      - LOG_LEVEL=info
+      # Set to 1 when running behind a reverse proxy (Nginx, Caddy, Traefik)
+      # so Express trusts X-Forwarded-For and X-Forwarded-Proto headers.
+      - TRUST_PROXY=1
+      # --- Replace placeholders with real values or use Docker secrets ---
+      - COOKIE_SECRET=change-me-generate-with-openssl-rand-hex-32
      - EMBY_URL=https://emby.example.com
      - EMBY_API_KEY=your-emby-api-key
      - SONARR_INSTANCES=[{"name":"main","url":"https://sonarr.example.com","apiKey":"your-sonarr-api-key"}]
      - RADARR_INSTANCES=[{"name":"main","url":"https://radarr.example.com","apiKey":"your-radarr-api-key"}]
      - SABNZBD_INSTANCES=[{"name":"main","url":"https://sabnzbd.example.com","apiKey":"your-sabnzbd-api-key"}]
      - QBITTORRENT_INSTANCES=[{"name":"main","url":"https://qbittorrent.example.com","username":"admin","password":"your-password"}]
-      - LOG_LEVEL=info
+    volumes:
+      # Persistent volume for SQLite token store and log file
+      - sofarr-data:/app/data
+    # Run as the built-in non-root 'node' user (UID/GID 1000)
+    user: "1000:1000"
+    # Read-only root filesystem; only the data volume is writable
+    read_only: true
+    tmpfs:
+      - /tmp                    # Node.js needs a writable /tmp
+    security_opt:
+      - no-new-privileges:true  # prevent privilege escalation via setuid binaries
+    cap_drop:
+      - ALL                     # drop all Linux capabilities
+    cap_add: []                 # add back none — Node.js needs no special caps
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:3001/health"]
+      interval: 30s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 3
+      start_period: 10s
+
+volumes:
+  sofarr-data:
--- a/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
+++ b/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
@@ -80,18 +80,42 @@ Admin users can view all users' downloads, see server status, cache statistics,

 ## 2. Technology Stack

+### Runtime & Framework
+
 | Layer | Technology | Purpose |
-|-------|-----------|---------|
-| **Runtime** | Node.js 18+ | Server runtime |
+|-------|-----------|------|
+| **Runtime** | Node.js 22 (Alpine) | Server runtime |
 | **Framework** | Express 4.x | HTTP server, routing, middleware |
 | **HTTP Client** | axios 1.x | External API communication |
 | **Frontend** | Vanilla JS + CSS | Single-page app, no build step |
-| **Auth** | Emby API + httpOnly cookies | Session management |
-| **Caching** | In-memory Map with TTL | Reduce external API load |
-| **Scheduling** | `setInterval` | Background polling |
-| **Containerisation** | Docker (Alpine) | Production deployment |
+| **Containerisation** | Docker multi-stage (Alpine) | Production deployment |
 | **Logging** | Custom logger + `console.*` | File + stdout logging with levels |

+### Security Middleware
+
+| Package | Purpose |
+|---------|--------|
+| `helmet` 7.x | HTTP security headers (CSP with per-request nonce, HSTS, referrer policy) |
+| `express-rate-limit` 7.x | 300 req/15 min general limiter; 10 failed attempts/15 min login limiter |
+| `cookie-parser` 1.x | Signed cookie support (HMAC via `COOKIE_SECRET`) |
+
+### Auth & Session
+
+| Component | Technology | Details |
+|-----------|-----------|--------|
+| **Identity** | Emby API | `POST /Users/authenticatebyname` |
+| **Session cookie** | `httpOnly` + `sameSite: strict` | Signed when `COOKIE_SECRET` set |
+| **CSRF protection** | Double-submit cookie pattern | `csrf_token` cookie + `X-CSRF-Token` header |
+| **Token store** | JSON file (`DATA_DIR/tokens.json`) | Atomic writes, 31-day TTL, hourly pruning |
+
+### Testing
+
+| Tool | Purpose |
+|------|---------|
+| `vitest` 4.x | Test runner (V8 coverage built-in) |
+| `supertest` 7.x | HTTP integration testing |
+| `nock` 14.x | HTTP interception at Node layer (works with CJS `require('axios')`) |
+
 ---

 ## 3. Directory Structure
@@ -99,22 +123,26 @@ Admin users can view all users' downloads, see server status, cache statistics,
 ```
 sofarr/
 ├── server/                     # Backend application
-│   ├── index.js                # Entry point: Express setup, middleware, startup
+│   ├── index.js                # Entry point: logging setup, server listen, poller start
+│   ├── app.js                  # Express app factory (imported by index.js and tests)
 │   ├── routes/
-│   │   ├── auth.js             # POST /login, GET /me, POST /logout
-│   │   ├── dashboard.js        # GET /user-downloads, /user-summary, /status
+│   │   ├── auth.js             # POST /login, GET /me, GET /csrf, POST /logout
+│   │   ├── dashboard.js        # GET /user-downloads, /user-summary, /status, /cover-art
 │   │   ├── emby.js             # Proxy routes to Emby API
 │   │   ├── sabnzbd.js          # Proxy routes to SABnzbd API
 │   │   ├── sonarr.js           # Proxy routes to Sonarr API
 │   │   └── radarr.js           # Proxy routes to Radarr API
 │   ├── middleware/
-│   │   └── requireAuth.js      # httpOnly cookie auth middleware
+│   │   ├── requireAuth.js      # httpOnly cookie auth enforcement
+│   │   └── verifyCsrf.js       # CSRF double-submit cookie validation
 │   └── utils/
 │       ├── cache.js            # MemoryCache class (Map + TTL + stats)
 │       ├── config.js           # Multi-instance service configuration parser
-│       ├── logger.js           # File logger (server.log)
+│       ├── logger.js           # File logger (DATA_DIR/server.log)
 │       ├── poller.js           # Background polling engine + timing
-│       └── qbittorrent.js      # qBittorrent client with auth + torrent mapping
+│       ├── qbittorrent.js      # qBittorrent client with auth + torrent mapping
+│       ├── sanitizeError.js    # Redacts secrets from error messages before logging
+│       └── tokenStore.js       # JSON file-backed Emby token store (atomic, TTL)
 ├── public/                     # Static frontend (served by Express)
 │   ├── index.html              # HTML shell: splash, login, dashboard
 │   ├── app.js                  # All frontend logic (auth, rendering, status)
@@ -123,8 +151,21 @@ sofarr/
 │   ├── favicon-32.png          # 32px PNG favicon
 │   ├── favicon-192.png         # 192px PNG (apple-touch-icon / PWA)
 │   └── images/                 # Logo / splash screen assets
-├── Dockerfile                  # Production container image
+├── tests/
+│   ├── README.md               # Testing approach, design decisions, coverage targets
+│   ├── setup.js                # Global setup: isolated DATA_DIR, rate-limit bypass
+│   ├── unit/                   # Pure unit tests (no HTTP)
+│   └── integration/            # Supertest integration tests (nock for external HTTP)
+├── docs/
+│   ├── ARCHITECTURE.md         # This document
+│   └── diagrams/               # PlantUML source files
+├── .gitea/workflows/
+│   ├── ci.yml                  # Security audit + test/coverage CI jobs
+│   ├── build-image.yml         # Docker image build and push
+│   └── create-release.yml      # Release tagging workflow
+├── Dockerfile                  # Multi-stage production container image (node:22-alpine)
 ├── docker-compose.yaml         # Example compose deployment
+├── vitest.config.js            # Test runner configuration with per-file coverage thresholds
 ├── package.json                # Dependencies and scripts
 ├── .env.sample                 # Annotated environment variable template
 └── README.md                   # User-facing documentation
@@ -134,30 +175,45 @@ sofarr/

 ## 4. Component Architecture

-### 4.1 Server Entry Point (`server/index.js`)
+### 4.1 Application Factory (`server/app.js`) and Entry Point (`server/index.js`)

-Responsibilities:
- Load environment variables via `dotenv`
- Configure structured logging with level filtering (`LOG_LEVEL`)
- Redirect `console.*` to both stdout and `server.log`
- Mount Express middleware (cookie-parser, JSON, static files)
- Mount route modules under `/api/*`
+**`server/app.js`** is a `createApp(options?)` factory that builds and returns the configured Express `app` instance. It is imported by both `server/index.js` (production) and the test suite. Keeping app creation separate from `app.listen()` means tests get a clean instance without triggering log-file setup, `process.exit()` calls, or the background poller.
+
+`createApp` responsibilities:
+- Configure `trust proxy` from `TRUST_PROXY` env var
+- Apply `helmet` with a per-request CSP nonce (`crypto.randomBytes(16)`) for inline styles/scripts
+- Add `Permissions-Policy` header
+- Apply the general API rate limiter (300 req / 15 min per IP)
+- Mount `cookie-parser` (signed when `COOKIE_SECRET` is set)
+- Mount `express.json` (64 KB body limit)
+- Expose `/health` and `/ready` endpoints (no auth, no rate limit)
+- Mount `/api/auth` routes **before** CSRF middleware (login/logout are exempt)
+- Mount `verifyCsrf` for all subsequent `/api` routes
+- Mount remaining route modules under `/api/*`
+- Register global error handler (500 with sanitized message)
+
+**`server/index.js`** entry point responsibilities:
+- Load `.env` via `dotenv`
+- Configure structured logging (`LOG_LEVEL`) with `console.*` redirection to both stdout and `DATA_DIR/server.log`
+- Call `createApp()`, serve `public/` as static files, start `app.listen()`
 - Start the background poller

 ### 4.2 Route Modules

-| Module | Mount Point | Auth Required | Purpose |
-|--------|------------|---------------|---------|
-| `auth.js` | `/api/auth` | No (public) | Login, session check, logout |
-| `dashboard.js` | `/api/dashboard` | Yes (`requireAuth`) | Aggregated download data, status |
-| `emby.js` | `/api/emby` | Yes (`requireAuth`) | Proxy to Emby API |
-| `sabnzbd.js` | `/api/sabnzbd` | Yes (`requireAuth`) | Proxy to SABnzbd API |
-| `sonarr.js` | `/api/sonarr` | Yes (`requireAuth`) | Proxy to Sonarr API |
-| `radarr.js` | `/api/radarr` | Yes (`requireAuth`) | Proxy to Radarr API |
+| Module | Mount Point | Auth Required | CSRF Required | Purpose |
+|--------|------------|:-------------:|:-------------:|--------|
+| `auth.js` | `/api/auth` | No | No | Login, session check, CSRF token, logout |
+| `dashboard.js` | `/api/dashboard` | Yes (`requireAuth`) | Yes | Aggregated download data, status, cover-art proxy |
+| `emby.js` | `/api/emby` | Yes (`requireAuth`) | Yes | Proxy to Emby API |
+| `sabnzbd.js` | `/api/sabnzbd` | Yes (`requireAuth`) | Yes | Proxy to SABnzbd API |
+| `sonarr.js` | `/api/sonarr` | Yes (`requireAuth`) | Yes | Proxy to Sonarr API |
+| `radarr.js` | `/api/radarr` | Yes (`requireAuth`) | Yes | Proxy to Radarr API |

-`requireAuth` (`server/middleware/requireAuth.js`) reads the `emby_user` httpOnly cookie and attaches the parsed user to `req.user`. Returns `401` if the cookie is absent or malformed.
+**`requireAuth`** (`server/middleware/requireAuth.js`) reads the `emby_user` cookie (signed if `COOKIE_SECRET` is set) and attaches the parsed `{ id, name, isAdmin }` user to `req.user`. Returns `401` if the cookie is absent, tampered, or schema-invalid.

-> **Note:** The proxy routes (`emby`, `sabnzbd`, `sonarr`, `radarr`) use legacy single-instance env vars and are largely unused by the dashboard — they exist for direct API access. The dashboard reads from the poller cache.
+**`verifyCsrf`** (`server/middleware/verifyCsrf.js`) implements the double-submit cookie pattern for all state-changing requests (`POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`). Compares the `csrf_token` cookie against the `X-CSRF-Token` request header using `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. Safe methods (`GET`, `HEAD`, `OPTIONS`) are exempt. Auth routes are mounted **before** this middleware (login/logout are exempt by design — `sameSite: strict` provides equivalent protection).
+
+> **Note:** The proxy routes (`emby`, `sabnzbd`, `sonarr`, `radarr`) exist for direct API access. The dashboard itself reads from the poller cache — it does not proxy through these routes.

 ### 4.3 Utility Modules

@@ -167,9 +223,13 @@ Responsibilities:

 **`poller.js`** — Background polling engine. Fetches data from all configured service instances in parallel with per-task timing. Stores results in the cache with a configurable TTL. Can be disabled entirely (`POLL_INTERVAL=0`), in which case data is fetched on-demand per dashboard request.

-**`qbittorrent.js`** — `QBittorrentClient` class with cookie-based authentication, automatic re-auth on 403, and persistent client instances. Includes torrent-to-download mapping (`mapTorrentToDownload`) and formatting utilities.
+**`qbittorrent.js`** — `QBittorrentClient` class with cookie-based authentication, automatic re-auth on 403, and persistent client instances. Includes torrent-to-download mapping (`mapTorrentToDownload`) and formatting utilities (`formatBytes`, `formatSpeed`, `formatEta`).

-**`logger.js`** — Simple file appender writing timestamped messages to `server.log`.
+**`tokenStore.js`** — JSON file-backed store (`DATA_DIR/tokens.json`) for Emby `AccessToken`s. Tokens are stored server-side and **never sent to the client**. Writes are atomic (write to `.tmp` then rename). Entries expire after 31 days (slightly longer than the maximum 30-day cookie). Pruning runs on startup and hourly.
+
+**`sanitizeError.js`** — Redacts secrets from error message strings before they are logged or returned in API responses. Patterns: URL query-param secrets (`apikey=`, `token=`, etc.), HTTP auth headers (`Authorization:`, `X-Emby-Authorization:`, etc.), Bearer tokens, and basic-auth credentials in URLs.
+
+**`logger.js`** — Simple file appender writing timestamped messages to `DATA_DIR/server.log`.

 ---

@@ -212,12 +272,19 @@ When a user requests `/api/dashboard/user-downloads`:

 ### Flow

-1. User submits credentials via the login form
-2. Backend calls Emby `POST /Users/authenticatebyname`
-3. On success, fetches full user profile to determine admin status
-4. Sets an `httpOnly` cookie (`emby_user`) containing: `{ id, name, isAdmin }` — the Emby `AccessToken` is intentionally **not** stored in the cookie
-5. Cookie expires after 24 hours
-6. All subsequent dashboard requests read this cookie for identity
+1. User submits credentials (+ optional `rememberMe`) via the login form
+2. Backend applies the **login rate limiter** (max 10 failed attempts per IP per 15-minute window; successful requests don't count)
+3. Backend calls Emby `POST /Users/authenticatebyname` using a deterministic `DeviceId` derived from the username — this causes Emby to reuse the existing session rather than creating a new one on every login
+4. On success, fetches full user profile (`GET /Users/{id}`) to determine admin status
+5. Stores the Emby `AccessToken` in **`tokenStore`** (server-side, never sent to the client)
+6. Sets an `httpOnly` `emby_user` cookie containing only `{ id, name, isAdmin }`:
+   - **`rememberMe: true`** → persistent cookie, `Max-Age` 30 days
+   - **`rememberMe: false`** → session cookie (no `Max-Age`; expires when browser closes)
+   - `secure` flag enabled when `NODE_ENV=production`
+   - Signed with HMAC when `COOKIE_SECRET` is set
+7. Issues a `csrf_token` cookie (`httpOnly: false` so JS can read it) containing a 32-byte random hex token
+8. Returns `{ success: true, user, csrfToken }` — the SPA stores `csrfToken` in memory and sends it as `X-CSRF-Token` on all subsequent state-changing requests
+9. All subsequent dashboard requests read the `emby_user` cookie for identity via `requireAuth`

 ### Authorisation Matrix

@@ -336,47 +403,76 @@ Each matched download produces an object with:

 ### `POST /api/auth/login`

-Authenticate a user via Emby.
+Authenticate a user via Emby. Rate-limited to **10 failed attempts per IP per 15 minutes**.

 **Request Body:**
 ```json
-{ "username": "string", "password": "string" }
+{ "username": "string", "password": "string", "rememberMe": false }
 ```

+| Field | Required | Description |
+|-------|:--------:|-----------|
+| `username` | Yes | Max 128 chars, must be a non-empty string |
+| `password` | Yes | Max 256 chars |
+| `rememberMe` | No | `true` = 30-day persistent cookie; `false`/omitted = session cookie |
+
 **Response (200):**
 ```json
 {
  "success": true,
-  "user": { "id": "string", "name": "string", "isAdmin": true }
+  "user": { "id": "string", "name": "string", "isAdmin": false },
+  "csrfToken": "64-char hex string"
 }
 ```

+**Response (400):** Invalid input (empty/overlong username or password).
+
 **Response (401):**
 ```json
 { "success": false, "error": "Invalid username or password" }
 ```

-**Side Effect:** Sets `emby_user` httpOnly cookie (24h TTL, `httpOnly`, `secure` in production, `sameSite: strict`). Cookie payload: `{ id, name, isAdmin }` — Emby `AccessToken` is not stored.
+**Response (429):** Too many failed attempts from this IP.
+
+**Side Effects:**
+- Sets `emby_user` cookie: `httpOnly`, `sameSite: strict`, `secure` in production, signed if `COOKIE_SECRET` is set. Payload: `{ id, name, isAdmin }`. The Emby `AccessToken` is **never** included.
+- Sets `csrf_token` cookie: `httpOnly: false` (JS-readable), same security flags. 64-char hex.
+- Stores the Emby `AccessToken` server-side in `tokenStore` (used only for server-side Emby logout).

 ---

 ### `GET /api/auth/me`

-Check current session.
+Check current session (no auth required — returns unauthenticated state rather than 401).

-**Response:**
+**Response (authenticated):**
 ```json
-{
-  "authenticated": true,
-  "user": { "id": "string", "name": "string", "isAdmin": false }
-}
+{ "authenticated": true, "user": { "id": "string", "name": "string", "isAdmin": false } }
 ```

+**Response (not authenticated):**
+```json
+{ "authenticated": false }
+```
+
+---
+
+### `GET /api/auth/csrf`
+
+Issue a fresh CSRF token. Used by the SPA after a page reload when the in-memory `csrfToken` variable is lost.
+
+**Response (200):**
+```json
+{ "csrfToken": "64-char hex string" }
+```
+
+**Side Effect:** Sets a new `csrf_token` cookie.
+
 ---

 ### `POST /api/auth/logout`

-Clear session cookie.
+Clear session and revoke the Emby token server-side. Does **not** require a CSRF token (auth routes are mounted before `verifyCsrf`; `sameSite: strict` provides equivalent protection).

 ---

@@ -518,26 +614,47 @@ The dashboard polls the server at the user-selected interval (1s, 5s, 10s, or Of

 ### Environment Variables

+#### Core
+
 | Variable | Required | Default | Description |
 |----------|:--------:|---------|-------------|
 | `PORT` | No | `3001` | Server listen port |
-| `EMBY_URL` | Yes | — | Emby/Jellyfin server URL |
-| `EMBY_API_KEY` | Yes | — | Emby API key |
+| `NODE_ENV` | No | — | Set to `production` to enable `secure` cookies and HTTPS upgrades |
+| `DATA_DIR` | No | `./data` | Directory for `tokens.json` and `server.log`. Must be writable by the server process. In Docker: `/app/data` (named volume). |
+| `COOKIE_SECRET` | No | — | If set, signs all session cookies with HMAC-SHA256. Strongly recommended in production. |
+| `TRUST_PROXY` | No | — | Express `trust proxy` setting. Set to `1` (or a hop count) when behind a reverse proxy (nginx, Traefik, etc.) so `req.ip` and `req.secure` are correct. |
+
+#### Emby
+
+| Variable | Required | Default | Description |
+|----------|:--------:|---------|-------------|
+| `EMBY_URL` | Yes | — | Emby/Jellyfin base URL (e.g. `https://emby.example.com`) |
+| `EMBY_API_KEY` | Yes | — | Emby API key (used by the poller to list users for tag badge classification) |
+
+#### Service Instances
+
+| Variable | Required | Default | Description |
+|----------|:--------:|---------|-------------|
 | `SONARR_INSTANCES` | Yes* | — | JSON array of Sonarr instances |
-| `SONARR_URL` | Yes* | — | Legacy single Sonarr URL |
-| `SONARR_API_KEY` | Yes* | — | Legacy single Sonarr API key |
+| `SONARR_URL` | Yes* | — | Legacy: single Sonarr URL |
+| `SONARR_API_KEY` | Yes* | — | Legacy: single Sonarr API key |
 | `RADARR_INSTANCES` | Yes* | — | JSON array of Radarr instances |
-| `RADARR_URL` | Yes* | — | Legacy single Radarr URL |
-| `RADARR_API_KEY` | Yes* | — | Legacy single Radarr API key |
+| `RADARR_URL` | Yes* | — | Legacy: single Radarr URL |
+| `RADARR_API_KEY` | Yes* | — | Legacy: single Radarr API key |
 | `SABNZBD_INSTANCES` | Yes* | — | JSON array of SABnzbd instances |
-| `SABNZBD_URL` | Yes* | — | Legacy single SABnzbd URL |
-| `SABNZBD_API_KEY` | Yes* | — | Legacy single SABnzbd API key |
+| `SABNZBD_URL` | Yes* | — | Legacy: single SABnzbd URL |
+| `SABNZBD_API_KEY` | Yes* | — | Legacy: single SABnzbd API key |
 | `QBITTORRENT_INSTANCES` | No | — | JSON array of qBittorrent instances |
-| `POLL_INTERVAL` | No | `5000` | Poll interval in ms, or `off`/`0` to disable |
-| `LOG_LEVEL` | No | `info` | `debug`, `info`, `warn`, `error`, `silent` |

 \* Either `*_INSTANCES` (JSON array) or legacy `*_URL` + `*_API_KEY` format is required.

+#### Tuning
+
+| Variable | Required | Default | Description |
+|----------|:--------:|---------|-------------|
+| `POLL_INTERVAL` | No | `5000` | Poll interval in ms. Set to `0`, `off`, or `false` to disable background polling (on-demand mode). |
+| `LOG_LEVEL` | No | `info` | `debug`, `info`, `warn`, `error`, `silent` |
+
 ### Instance JSON Format

 ```json
@@ -561,24 +678,20 @@ qBittorrent instances use `username` and `password` instead of `apiKey`.

 ## 12. Deployment

-### Docker
+### Docker image

-```dockerfile
-FROM node:18-alpine
-WORKDIR /app
-COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
-RUN npm ci --omit=dev
-COPY server/ ./server/
-COPY public/ ./public/
-EXPOSE 3001
-ENV NODE_ENV=production
-CMD ["node", "server/index.js"]
-```
+The production image uses a two-stage build on `node:22-alpine`:
+
+1. **`deps` stage** — runs `npm ci --omit=dev` to install only production dependencies.
+2. **`runtime` stage** — copies `node_modules`, `server/`, `public/`, and `package.json`. Runs as the built-in non-root `node` user (UID 1000). `/app/data` is owned by `node` for writable token store and logs.
+
+Key environment variables set in the image:
+- `NODE_ENV=production` — enables secure cookies and HTTPS upgrade CSP directive
+- `DATA_DIR=/app/data` — token store and log file location

 ### Docker Compose

 ```yaml
-version: "3"
 services:
  sofarr:
    image: docker.i3omb.com/sofarr:latest
@@ -587,6 +700,10 @@ services:
    ports:
      - "3001:3001"
    environment:
+      - NODE_ENV=production
+      - DATA_DIR=/app/data
+      - COOKIE_SECRET=change-me-to-a-long-random-string
+      - TRUST_PROXY=1                 # set if behind nginx/Traefik
      - EMBY_URL=https://emby.example.com
      - EMBY_API_KEY=your-emby-api-key
      - SONARR_INSTANCES=[{"name":"main","url":"...","apiKey":"..."}]
@@ -595,8 +712,31 @@ services:
      - QBITTORRENT_INSTANCES=[{"name":"main","url":"...","username":"...","password":"..."}]
      - POLL_INTERVAL=5000
      - LOG_LEVEL=info
+    volumes:
+      - sofarr-data:/app/data         # persists tokens.json and server.log
+
+volumes:
+  sofarr-data:
 ```

+### Security hardening checklist
+
+- **Set `COOKIE_SECRET`** — enables HMAC-signed cookies, preventing client-side forgery.
+- **Set `TRUST_PROXY=1`** when behind a reverse proxy — ensures `req.secure` is `true` so the `secure` cookie flag is enforced and HTTPS-upgrade CSP fires.
+- **Mount a named volume** for `DATA_DIR` — token store and log file survive container recreates.
+- **Use HTTPS** — the CSP includes `upgrade-insecure-requests` in production and the HSTS header is set with a 1-year `maxAge`.
+- **Rate limiting** — the login endpoint is limited to 10 failed attempts per IP per 15 minutes; all API endpoints share a 300 req/15 min window. Set `TRUST_PROXY` correctly so the client IP is not the proxy's IP.
+
+### CI / CD
+
+The `.gitea/workflows/` directory contains three pipeline definitions:
+
+| File | Trigger | Purpose |
+|------|---------|--------|
+| `ci.yml` | Every push / PR | Security audit (`npm audit --audit-level=high`) + tests with V8 coverage |
+| `build-image.yml` | Push to `main` / `develop` | Build and push Docker image to `docker.i3omb.com` |
+| `create-release.yml` | Tag push (`v*`) | Create a Gitea release |
+
 ---

 ## 13. UML Diagrams (PlantUML)
--- a/docs/diagrams/class-server.puml
+++ b/docs/diagrams/class-server.puml
@@ -9,19 +9,33 @@ package "server/index.js" as entry {
    - logFile : WriteStream
    + shouldLog(level) : boolean
    --
-    Configures Express app,
-    mounts routes, starts poller
+    Logging setup, app.listen(),
+    static files, startPoller()
+  }
+}
+
+package "server/app.js" as appfactory {
+  class "createApp(options?)" as appfn <<factory>> {
+    + createApp(skipRateLimits?) : Express
+    --
+    Mounts helmet (CSP nonce),
+    rate limiters, cookie-parser,
+    auth routes (pre-CSRF),
+    verifyCsrf, all other routes,
+    /health, /ready, error handler
  }
 }

 package "server/routes" {
  class "auth.js" as auth <<router>> {
-    + POST /login
+    + POST /login (rate-limited)
    + GET /me
+    + GET /csrf
    + POST /logout
    --
    Authenticates via Emby API
-    Sets/reads httpOnly cookie
+    Issues emby_user + csrf_token cookies
+    Stores/revokes Emby tokens server-side
  }

  class "dashboard.js" as dashboard <<router>> {
@@ -76,9 +90,20 @@ package "server/middleware" {
  class "requireAuth.js" as requireauth <<middleware>> {
    + requireAuth(req, res, next) : void
    --
-    Reads emby_user cookie
-    Attaches parsed user to req.user
-    Returns 401 if absent/invalid
+    Reads emby_user cookie (signed if COOKIE_SECRET)
+    Validates schema: id, name, isAdmin
+    Attaches user to req.user
+    Returns 401 if absent/tampered/invalid
+  }
+
+  class "verifyCsrf.js" as verifycsrf <<middleware>> {
+    + verifyCsrf(req, res, next) : void
+    --
+    Exempt: GET, HEAD, OPTIONS
+    Compares csrf_token cookie
+    vs X-CSRF-Token header
+    using crypto.timingSafeEqual
+    Returns 403 on mismatch/missing
  }
 }

@@ -171,6 +196,27 @@ package "server/utils" {
    + logToFile(message) : void
  }

+  class "TokenStore" as tokenstore <<module>> {
+    - store : Object (in-memory)
+    - STORE_PATH : string (DATA_DIR/tokens.json)
+    - TOKEN_TTL_MS : 31 days
+    --
+    + storeToken(userId, accessToken) : void
+    + getToken(userId) : {accessToken}|null
+    + clearToken(userId) : void
+    --
+    Atomic write (.tmp → rename)
+    Pruned on startup + hourly
+  }
+
+  class "SanitizeError" as sanitize <<module>> {
+    + sanitizeError(err) : string
+    --
+    Redacts: query-param secrets,
+    auth headers, bearer tokens,
+    basic-auth URLs
+  }
+
  class "TagBadge" as tb <<value>> {
    + label : string
    + matchedUser : string | null
@@ -184,19 +230,24 @@ package "server/utils" {
 }

 ' Relationships
-ep --> auth
-ep --> dashboard
-ep --> emby_r
-ep --> sab_r
-ep --> sonarr_r
-ep --> radarr_r
+ep --> appfn : createApp()
+ep --> poller : startPoller()
+
+appfn --> auth : /api/auth (pre-CSRF)
+appfn --> verifycsrf : /api (all routes below)
+appfn --> dashboard
+appfn --> emby_r
+appfn --> sab_r
+appfn --> sonarr_r
+appfn --> radarr_r

 dashboard --> requireauth : uses
 emby_r --> requireauth : uses
 sab_r --> requireauth : uses
 sonarr_r --> requireauth : uses
 radarr_r --> requireauth : uses
-ep --> poller : startPoller()
+
+auth --> tokenstore : storeToken / getToken / clearToken

 dashboard --> cache : read/write
 dashboard --> poller : pollAllServices()
@@ -218,4 +269,7 @@ dashboard *-- ci : stores in activeClients

 config ..> inst : returns

+auth ..> sanitize : sanitizeError on catch
+dashboard ..> sanitize : sanitizeError on catch
+
@enduml
--- a/docs/diagrams/component.puml
+++ b/docs/diagrams/component.puml
@@ -15,15 +15,21 @@ package "Browser" as browser {

 package "Express Server" as server {

+  [index.js\nEntry Point] as entry
+  [app.js\ncreatApp() factory] as appfactory
+
  package "Middleware" {
-    [cookie-parser] as cp
-    [express.json] as ej
+    [helmet\n(CSP nonce, HSTS)] as hm
+    [express-rate-limit\n(API + login)] as rl
+    [cookie-parser\n(signed cookies)] as cp
+    [express.json\n(64kb limit)] as ej
    [express.static] as es
    [requireAuth.js] as requireauth
+    [verifyCsrf.js\n(double-submit)] as verifycsrf
  }

  package "Routes" as routes {
-    [auth.js\n/api/auth] as auth
+    [auth.js\n/api/auth\n(pre-CSRF)] as auth
    [dashboard.js\n/api/dashboard] as dashboard
    [emby.js\n/api/emby] as emby_route
    [sabnzbd.js\n/api/sabnzbd] as sab_route
@@ -36,27 +42,34 @@ package "Express Server" as server {
    [cache.js\nMemoryCache] as cache
    [config.js] as config
    [qbittorrent.js\nQBittorrentClient] as qbt
+    [tokenStore.js\n(tokens.json)] as tokenstore
+    [sanitizeError.js] as sanitize
    [logger.js] as logger
  }

-  [index.js\nEntry Point] as entry
+  entry --> appfactory : createApp()
+  entry --> es : serve public/
+  entry --> poller : startPoller()

-  entry --> cp
-  entry --> ej
-  entry --> es
-  entry --> auth
-  entry --> dashboard
-  entry --> emby_route
-  entry --> sab_route
-  entry --> sonarr_route
-  entry --> radarr_route
+  appfactory --> hm
+  appfactory --> rl
+  appfactory --> cp
+  appfactory --> ej
+  appfactory --> auth : mount before verifyCsrf
+  appfactory --> verifycsrf : applied to all /api below
+  appfactory --> dashboard
+  appfactory --> emby_route
+  appfactory --> sab_route
+  appfactory --> sonarr_route
+  appfactory --> radarr_route

  emby_route --> requireauth
  sab_route --> requireauth
  sonarr_route --> requireauth
  radarr_route --> requireauth
  dashboard --> requireauth
-  entry --> poller : startPoller()
+
+  auth --> tokenstore : storeToken / getToken / clearToken

  dashboard --> cache : read poll:* keys
  dashboard --> poller : pollAllServices()\n(on-demand mode)
@@ -70,6 +83,9 @@ package "Express Server" as server {

  qbt --> config : getQbittorrentInstances()
  qbt --> logger
+
+  auth ..> sanitize
+  dashboard ..> sanitize
 }

 cloud "External Services" as external {
--- a/docs/diagrams/seq-auth.puml
+++ b/docs/diagrams/seq-auth.puml
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ title sofarr — Authentication Sequence
 actor User as user
 participant "Browser\n(app.js)" as browser
 participant "Express\n/api/auth" as auth
+participant "TokenStore\n(tokens.json)" as tokens
 participant "Emby\nServer" as emby

 == Page Load ==
@@ -12,14 +13,19 @@ user -> browser : Navigate to sofarr
 activate browser
 browser -> auth : GET /api/auth/me
 activate auth
-auth -> auth : Read emby_user cookie
+auth -> auth : Read emby_user cookie\n(signed if COOKIE_SECRET set)
 alt Cookie exists and valid
  auth --> browser : { authenticated: true, user: { name, isAdmin } }
+  browser -> auth : GET /api/auth/csrf
+  activate auth
+  auth -> auth : Generate 32-byte hex csrfToken
+  auth --> browser : { csrfToken } + Set csrf_token cookie
+  deactivate auth
+  browser -> browser : store csrfToken in memory
  browser -> browser : showDashboard()
-  browser -> browser : fetchUserDownloads(true)
  browser -> browser : startAutoRefresh()
  browser -> browser : dismissSplash()
-else No cookie
+else No cookie / tampered
  auth --> browser : { authenticated: false }
  browser -> browser : dismissSplash()
  browser -> browser : showLogin()
@@ -27,38 +33,69 @@ end
 deactivate auth

 == Login ==
-user -> browser : Enter username + password
-browser -> auth : POST /api/auth/login\n{ username, password }
+user -> browser : Enter username + password\n(+ optional rememberMe checkbox)
+browser -> auth : POST /api/auth/login\n{ username, password, rememberMe }
 activate auth
-auth -> emby : POST /Users/authenticatebyname\n{ Username, Pw }
+note right of auth
+  Rate limiter: max 10 failed
+  attempts per IP / 15 min
+  (successful requests excluded)
+end note
+auth -> emby : POST /Users/authenticatebyname\n{ Username, Pw }\nX-Emby-Authorization: MediaBrowser\nDeviceId = sha256(username)[0:16]
 activate emby
 alt Valid credentials
-  emby --> auth : { User: { Id, ... }, AccessToken }
-  auth -> emby : GET /Users/{userId}
+  emby --> auth : { User: { Id }, AccessToken }
+  auth -> emby : GET /Users/{userId}\nX-MediaBrowser-Token: AccessToken
  emby --> auth : { Name, Policy: { IsAdministrator } }
  deactivate emby
-  auth -> auth : Set httpOnly cookie\nemby_user = { id, name, isAdmin }\n(24h TTL, secure in prod, sameSite=strict)\nNote: AccessToken NOT stored
-  auth --> browser : { success: true, user: { name, isAdmin } }
+  auth -> tokens : storeToken(userId, AccessToken)
+  note right of tokens
+    Stored server-side only.
+    Never sent to the client.
+    31-day TTL, atomic JSON write.
+  end note
+  auth -> auth : Set emby_user cookie\n{ id, name, isAdmin }\nhttpOnly, sameSite=strict\nsecure (prod), signed (COOKIE_SECRET)\nrememberMe=true → Max-Age 30d\nrememberMe=false → session cookie
+  auth -> auth : Generate csrfToken\n(32-byte random hex)
+  auth -> auth : Set csrf_token cookie\nhttpOnly=false (JS-readable)\nsameSite=strict, secure (prod)
+  auth --> browser : { success: true, user, csrfToken }
+  browser -> browser : store csrfToken in memory
  browser -> browser : fadeOutLogin()
-  browser -> browser : showSplash()
  browser -> browser : showDashboard()
-  browser -> browser : fetchUserDownloads(true)
  browser -> browser : startAutoRefresh()
  browser -> browser : dismissSplash()
 else Invalid credentials
  emby --> auth : 401 Error
  deactivate emby
-  auth --> browser : { success: false, error: "Invalid..." }
+  auth --> browser : { success: false, error: "Invalid username or password" }
  browser -> browser : showLoginError()
 end
 deactivate auth

+== CSRF Token Refresh (after page reload) ==
+note over browser : csrfToken lost from memory\non hard page reload
+browser -> auth : GET /api/auth/csrf
+activate auth
+auth -> auth : Generate new csrfToken
+auth --> browser : { csrfToken } + new csrf_token cookie
+deactivate auth
+browser -> browser : store new csrfToken in memory
+
 == Logout ==
 user -> browser : Click Logout
 browser -> browser : stopAutoRefresh()
-browser -> auth : POST /api/auth/logout
+browser -> auth : POST /api/auth/logout\n(no CSRF required — auth routes\nexempt; sameSite:strict protects)
 activate auth
-auth -> auth : Clear emby_user cookie
+auth -> auth : Parse emby_user cookie → user
+auth -> tokens : getToken(user.id)
+activate tokens
+tokens --> auth : { accessToken }
+deactivate tokens
+auth -> emby : POST /Sessions/Logout\nX-MediaBrowser-Token: accessToken
+activate emby
+emby --> auth : 204 / error (ignored)
+deactivate emby
+auth -> tokens : clearToken(user.id)
+auth -> auth : clearCookie(emby_user)\nclearCookie(csrf_token)
 auth --> browser : { success: true }
 deactivate auth
 browser -> browser : showLogin()
--- a/package-lock.json
+++ b/package-lock.json
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -1,27 +1,35 @@
 {
  "name": "sofarr",
-  "version": "0.1.5",
+  "version": "0.2.0",
  "description": "A personal media download dashboard that shows your downloads 'so far' while you relax on the sofa waiting for your *arr services to finish",
  "main": "server/index.js",
  "scripts": {
    "dev": "nodemon server/index.js",
    "start": "node server/index.js",
    "install:all": "npm install",
-    "audit": "npm audit --audit-level=moderate",
-    "audit:fix": "npm audit fix"
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "test:watch": "vitest",
+    "test:coverage": "vitest run --coverage",
+    "test:ui": "vitest --ui",
+    "audit": "npm audit --audit-level=high",
+    "audit:fix": "npm audit fix",
+    "audit:critical": "npm audit --audit-level=critical"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "axios": "^1.6.0",
    "cookie-parser": "^1.4.6",
-    "cors": "^2.8.5",
    "dotenv": "^16.3.1",
    "express": "^4.18.2",
-    "express-rate-limit": "^6.7.0",
-    "helmet": "^4.6.0"
+    "express-rate-limit": "^7.0.0",
+    "helmet": "^7.0.0"
  },
  "devDependencies": {
+    "@vitest/coverage-v8": "^4.1.6",
    "concurrently": "^7.6.0",
-    "nodemon": "^3.1.14"
+    "nock": "^14.0.15",
+    "nodemon": "^3.1.14",
+    "supertest": "^7.2.2",
+    "vitest": "^4.1.6"
  },
  "keywords": [
    "sabnzbd",
--- a/public/app.js
+++ b/public/app.js
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ let refreshInterval = null;
 let currentRefreshRate = 5000; // default 5 seconds
 let isAdmin = false;
 let showAll = false;
+let csrfToken = null; // double-submit CSRF token, sent as X-CSRF-Token on mutating requests
 const SPLASH_MIN_MS = 1200; // minimum splash display time

 // Apply saved theme immediately (before DOMContentLoaded to avoid flash)
@@ -118,9 +119,15 @@ function dismissSplash(startTime) {
 async function checkAuthentication() {
  const splashStart = Date.now();
  try {
-    const response = await fetch('/api/auth/me');
-    const data = await response.json();
-    
+    // Fetch both auth state and a fresh CSRF token in parallel
+    const [meRes, csrfRes] = await Promise.all([
+      fetch('/api/auth/me'),
+      fetch('/api/auth/csrf')
+    ]);
+    const data = await meRes.json();
+    const csrfData = await csrfRes.json();
+    if (csrfData.csrfToken) csrfToken = csrfData.csrfToken;
+
    if (data.authenticated) {
      currentUser = data.user;
      isAdmin = !!data.user.isAdmin;
@@ -160,6 +167,8 @@ async function handleLogin(e) {
    if (data.success) {
      currentUser = data.user;
      isAdmin = !!data.user.isAdmin;
+      // Store CSRF token returned by login for use in subsequent requests
+      if (data.csrfToken) csrfToken = data.csrfToken;
      // Fade out login, then show splash while loading data.
      // requestAnimationFrame ensures the browser paints the splash at
      // opacity:1 before dismissSplash adds fade-out, so the CSS
@@ -185,9 +194,11 @@ async function handleLogout() {
  try {
    stopAutoRefresh();
    await fetch('/api/auth/logout', {
-      method: 'POST'
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: csrfToken ? { 'X-CSRF-Token': csrfToken } : {}
    });
    currentUser = null;
+    csrfToken = null;
    downloads = [];
    showLogin();
  } catch (err) {
@@ -376,7 +387,11 @@ function createDownloadCard(download) {
    const coverDiv = document.createElement('div');
    coverDiv.className = 'download-cover';
    const coverImg = document.createElement('img');
-    coverImg.src = download.coverArt;
+    // Proxy cover art through the server so the CSP img-src 'self' rule
+    // is satisfied (external poster URLs would be blocked otherwise).
+    coverImg.src = download.coverArt
+      ? '/api/dashboard/cover-art?url=' + encodeURIComponent(download.coverArt)
+      : '';
    coverImg.alt = download.movieName || download.seriesName || download.title;
    coverImg.loading = 'lazy';
    coverDiv.appendChild(coverImg);
--- a/server/app.js
+++ b/server/app.js
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/**
+ * Express application factory — imported by both server/index.js (production)
+ * and the test suite. Keeping app creation separate from app.listen() means
+ * tests can import a fresh instance without starting a real server or
+ * triggering the side-effects in index.js (log files, process.exit, poller).
+ */
+
+const express = require('express');
+const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
+const helmet = require('helmet');
+const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+
+const sabnzbdRoutes = require('./routes/sabnzbd');
+const sonarrRoutes = require('./routes/sonarr');
+const radarrRoutes = require('./routes/radarr');
+const embyRoutes = require('./routes/emby');
+const dashboardRoutes = require('./routes/dashboard');
+const authRoutes = require('./routes/auth');
+const verifyCsrf = require('./middleware/verifyCsrf');
+
+function createApp({ skipRateLimits = false } = {}) {
+  const app = express();
+
+  if (process.env.TRUST_PROXY) {
+    const trustValue = /^\d+$/.test(process.env.TRUST_PROXY)
+      ? parseInt(process.env.TRUST_PROXY, 10)
+      : process.env.TRUST_PROXY;
+    app.set('trust proxy', trustValue);
+  }
+
+  // Per-request CSP nonce
+  app.use((req, res, next) => {
+    res.locals.cspNonce = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64');
+    next();
+  });
+
+  app.use((req, res, next) => {
+    helmet({
+      contentSecurityPolicy: {
+        directives: {
+          defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
+          scriptSrc: ["'self'", (req, res) => `'nonce-${res.locals.cspNonce}'`],
+          styleSrc: ["'self'", (req, res) => `'nonce-${res.locals.cspNonce}'`],
+          imgSrc: ["'self'", 'data:', 'blob:'],
+          fontSrc: ["'self'", 'data:'],
+          connectSrc: ["'self'"],
+          objectSrc: ["'none'"],
+          baseUri: ["'self'"],
+          frameAncestors: ["'none'"],
+          formAction: ["'self'"],
+          upgradeInsecureRequests: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' ? [] : null
+        }
+      },
+      hsts: { maxAge: 31536000, includeSubDomains: true, preload: true },
+      referrerPolicy: { policy: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' },
+      crossOriginEmbedderPolicy: false
+    })(req, res, next);
+  });
+
+  app.use((req, res, next) => {
+    res.setHeader('Permissions-Policy', 'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()');
+    next();
+  });
+
+  const apiLimiter = rateLimit({
+    windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
+    max: skipRateLimits ? Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER : 300,
+    standardHeaders: true,
+    legacyHeaders: false,
+    message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' }
+  });
+
+  app.use(cookieParser(process.env.COOKIE_SECRET || undefined));
+  app.use(express.json({ limit: '64kb' }));
+
+  // Health / readiness (no auth, no rate-limit)
+  app.get('/health', (req, res) => {
+    res.json({ status: 'ok', uptime: process.uptime() });
+  });
+
+  app.get('/ready', (req, res) => {
+    const ready = !!(process.env.EMBY_URL);
+    if (ready) {
+      res.json({ status: 'ready' });
+    } else {
+      res.status(503).json({ status: 'not ready', reason: 'EMBY_URL not configured' });
+    }
+  });
+
+  // API routes
+  app.use('/api', apiLimiter);
+  app.use('/api/auth', authRoutes);
+
+  // CSRF protection for all state-changing API requests below
+  app.use('/api', verifyCsrf);
+  app.use('/api/sabnzbd', sabnzbdRoutes);
+  app.use('/api/sonarr', sonarrRoutes);
+  app.use('/api/radarr', radarrRoutes);
+  app.use('/api/emby', embyRoutes);
+  app.use('/api/dashboard', dashboardRoutes);
+
+  // Global error handler
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+  app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+    console.error('[Server] Unhandled error:', err.message);
+    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
+  });
+
+  return app;
+}
+
+module.exports = { createApp };
--- a/server/index.js
+++ b/server/index.js
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ const express = require('express');
 const path = require('path');
 const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
 const helmet = require('helmet');
+const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
 const fs = require('fs');
 require('dotenv').config();

@@ -10,7 +12,29 @@ require('dotenv').config();
 const LOG_LEVELS = { debug: 0, info: 1, warn: 2, error: 3, silent: 4 };
 const currentLevel = LOG_LEVELS[(process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info').toLowerCase()] || 1;

-const logFile = fs.createWriteStream(path.join(__dirname, '../server.log'), { flags: 'a' });
+// Log file lives in DATA_DIR so the non-root container user can write to it
+const DATA_DIR = process.env.DATA_DIR || path.join(__dirname, '../data');
+if (!fs.existsSync(DATA_DIR)) fs.mkdirSync(DATA_DIR, { recursive: true });
+
+const LOG_PATH = path.join(DATA_DIR, 'server.log');
+const LOG_MAX_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10 MB per file
+const LOG_KEEP = 3;                      // keep 3 rotated files
+
+function rotateLogIfNeeded() {
+  try {
+    const stat = fs.statSync(LOG_PATH);
+    if (stat.size < LOG_MAX_BYTES) return;
+    for (let i = LOG_KEEP - 1; i >= 1; i--) {
+      const src = `${LOG_PATH}.${i}`;
+      const dst = `${LOG_PATH}.${i + 1}`;
+      if (fs.existsSync(src)) fs.renameSync(src, dst);
+    }
+    fs.renameSync(LOG_PATH, `${LOG_PATH}.1`);
+  } catch { /* ignore rotation errors — don't crash the server */ }
+}
+
+rotateLogIfNeeded();
+const logFile = fs.createWriteStream(LOG_PATH, { flags: 'a' });
 const originalConsoleLog = console.log;
 const originalConsoleError = console.error;
 const originalConsoleWarn = console.warn;
@@ -54,35 +78,173 @@ const radarrRoutes = require('./routes/radarr');
 const embyRoutes = require('./routes/emby');
 const dashboardRoutes = require('./routes/dashboard');
 const authRoutes = require('./routes/auth');
+const verifyCsrf = require('./middleware/verifyCsrf');
 const { startPoller, POLL_INTERVAL, POLLING_ENABLED } = require('./utils/poller');

+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Startup environment validation
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const cookieSecret = process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
+if (!cookieSecret && process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
+  console.error('[Security] COOKIE_SECRET is not set in production — aborting.');
+  process.exit(1);
+} else if (!cookieSecret) {
+  console.warn('[Security] COOKIE_SECRET not set — unsigned cookies (dev only)');
+}
+if (!process.env.EMBY_URL && process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
+  console.error('[Config] EMBY_URL is required');
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
 const app = express();
 const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3001;

-app.use(helmet({
-  contentSecurityPolicy: false // SPA uses inline scripts; CSP requires a nonce/hash strategy
-}));
-
-const cookieSecret = process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
-if (!cookieSecret && process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
-  console.error('[Security] COOKIE_SECRET is not set in production — cookies are unsigned and can be tampered with!');
-  process.exit(1);
-} else if (!cookieSecret) {
-  console.warn('[Security] COOKIE_SECRET is not set — using unsigned cookies (acceptable for development only)');
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Trust proxy — required when behind Nginx/Caddy/Traefik so that
+// req.ip reflects the real client IP (not 127.0.0.1) and
+// req.secure is true when the upstream TLS is terminated by the proxy.
+// Set TRUST_PROXY=1 (or a specific IP/CIDR) via env.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+if (process.env.TRUST_PROXY) {
+  const trustValue = /^\d+$/.test(process.env.TRUST_PROXY)
+    ? parseInt(process.env.TRUST_PROXY, 10)
+    : process.env.TRUST_PROXY;
+  app.set('trust proxy', trustValue);
 }
-app.use(cookieParser(cookieSecret || undefined));
-app.use(express.json());
-app.use(express.static(path.join(__dirname, '../public')));

+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Helmet v7 — security response headers
+// CSP uses a per-request nonce injected into index.html so inline scripts
+// and styles are allowed only with a valid nonce, not blanket unsafe-inline.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+app.use((req, res, next) => {
+  // Generate a fresh nonce for every request
+  res.locals.cspNonce = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64');
+  next();
+});
+
+app.use((req, res, next) => {
+  helmet({
+    contentSecurityPolicy: {
+      directives: {
+        defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
+        scriptSrc: ["'self'", (req, res) => `'nonce-${res.locals.cspNonce}'`],
+        styleSrc: ["'self'", (req, res) => `'nonce-${res.locals.cspNonce}'`],
+        imgSrc: ["'self'", 'data:', 'blob:'],
+        fontSrc: ["'self'", 'data:'],
+        connectSrc: ["'self'"],
+        objectSrc: ["'none'"],
+        baseUri: ["'self'"],
+        frameAncestors: ["'none'"],
+        formAction: ["'self'"],
+        upgradeInsecureRequests: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' ? [] : null
+      }
+    },
+    hsts: {
+      maxAge: 31536000,       // 1 year
+      includeSubDomains: true,
+      preload: true
+    },
+    referrerPolicy: { policy: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' },
+    crossOriginEmbedderPolicy: false // not needed for this SPA
+  })(req, res, next);
+});
+
+// Permissions-Policy — disable powerful browser features not needed by the app
+app.use((req, res, next) => {
+  res.setHeader(
+    'Permissions-Policy',
+    'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()'
+  );
+  next();
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// General API rate limiter — applies to all /api/* routes
+// More specific limiters (e.g. login) apply on top of this.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const apiLimiter = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,   // 15 minutes
+  max: 300,                    // 300 requests per IP per window (generous for polling)
+  standardHeaders: true,
+  legacyHeaders: false,
+  message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again later' }
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Body parsing & cookies
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+app.use(cookieParser(cookieSecret || undefined));
+app.use(express.json({ limit: '64kb' })); // prevent oversized JSON payloads
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Health / readiness endpoints (no auth, no rate-limit)
+// Used by Docker HEALTHCHECK and orchestrators.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+app.get('/health', (req, res) => {
+  res.json({ status: 'ok', uptime: process.uptime() });
+});
+
+app.get('/ready', (req, res) => {
+  // Confirm critical config is present
+  const ready = !!(process.env.EMBY_URL);
+  if (ready) {
+    res.json({ status: 'ready' });
+  } else {
+    res.status(503).json({ status: 'not ready', reason: 'EMBY_URL not configured' });
+  }
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Static files — served before API routes
+// index.html is served manually so we can inject the CSP nonce
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const PUBLIC_DIR = path.join(__dirname, '../public');
+const INDEX_HTML = path.join(PUBLIC_DIR, 'index.html');
+
+// Serve all static assets (js, css, images, icons) except index.html
+app.use(express.static(PUBLIC_DIR, { index: false }));
+
+// Serve index.html with nonce injected into the <script> and <link> tags
+function serveIndex(req, res) {
+  fs.readFile(INDEX_HTML, 'utf8', (err, html) => {
+    if (err) return res.status(500).send('Internal Server Error');
+    const nonce = res.locals.cspNonce;
+    // Inject nonce into <script> and <link rel="stylesheet"> tags
+    const patched = html
+      .replace(/<script([^>]*)>/gi, `<script nonce="${nonce}"$1>`)
+      .replace(/<link([^>]*rel=["']stylesheet["'][^>]*)>/gi, `<link nonce="${nonce}"$1>`);
+    res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/html; charset=utf-8');
+    res.send(patched);
+  });
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// API routes (rate-limited; auth routes exempt CSRF for login/csrf endpoints)
+// CSRF protection applies to all state-changing /api/* requests except
+// /api/auth/login (pre-auth) and /api/auth/csrf (issues the token).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+app.use('/api', apiLimiter);
+app.use('/api/auth', authRoutes);
+
+// All routes below this point require CSRF validation on mutating methods
+app.use('/api', verifyCsrf);
 app.use('/api/sabnzbd', sabnzbdRoutes);
 app.use('/api/sonarr', sonarrRoutes);
 app.use('/api/radarr', radarrRoutes);
 app.use('/api/emby', embyRoutes);
 app.use('/api/dashboard', dashboardRoutes);
-app.use('/api/auth', authRoutes);

-app.get('/', (req, res) => {
-  res.sendFile(path.join(__dirname, '../public/index.html'));
+// SPA catch-all — serve index.html for any unmatched path
+app.get('*', serveIndex);
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Global error handler — never leak stack traces to clients
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-vars
+app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+  console.error('[Server] Unhandled error:', err.message);
+  res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
 });

 app.listen(PORT, () => {
@@ -91,6 +253,7 @@ app.listen(PORT, () => {
  console.log(`  Server running on port ${PORT}`);
  console.log(`  Log level: ${process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info'}`);
  console.log(`  Polling: ${POLLING_ENABLED ? POLL_INTERVAL + 'ms' : 'disabled (on-demand)'}`);
+  console.log(`  Trust proxy: ${process.env.TRUST_PROXY || 'disabled'}`);
  console.log(`=================================`);
  startPoller();
 });
--- a/server/middleware/verifyCsrf.js
+++ b/server/middleware/verifyCsrf.js
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/**
+ * CSRF protection using the double-submit cookie pattern.
+ *
+ * On login the server issues a random `csrf_token` cookie (httpOnly:false
+ * so JS can read it). The SPA must send the same value in the
+ * `X-CSRF-Token` request header for every state-changing request (POST,
+ * PUT, PATCH, DELETE).
+ *
+ * Because the `sameSite: strict` session cookie already provides strong
+ * protection in modern browsers, this acts as defence-in-depth for
+ * older browsers and any edge cases.
+ *
+ * Safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS) are exempted.
+ */
+
+const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS']);
+
+function verifyCsrf(req, res, next) {
+  if (SAFE_METHODS.has(req.method)) return next();
+
+  const cookieToken = req.cookies.csrf_token;
+  const headerToken = req.headers['x-csrf-token'];
+
+  if (!cookieToken || !headerToken) {
+    return res.status(403).json({ error: 'CSRF token missing' });
+  }
+
+  // Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
+  if (cookieToken.length !== headerToken.length) {
+    return res.status(403).json({ error: 'CSRF token invalid' });
+  }
+
+  const a = Buffer.from(cookieToken);
+  const b = Buffer.from(headerToken);
+  if (!require('crypto').timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {
+    return res.status(403).json({ error: 'CSRF token invalid' });
+  }
+
+  next();
+}
+
+module.exports = verifyCsrf;
--- a/server/routes/auth.js
+++ b/server/routes/auth.js
@@ -4,30 +4,22 @@ const crypto = require('crypto');
 const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
 const router = express.Router();

-const EMBY_URL = process.env.EMBY_URL;
-
-// Server-side token store: userId -> { accessToken }
-// Keeps AccessToken off the client; required for logout revocation.
-const tokenStore = new Map();
-
-function storeToken(userId, accessToken) {
-  tokenStore.set(userId, { accessToken });
-}
-
-function getToken(userId) {
-  return tokenStore.get(userId) || null;
-}
-
-function clearToken(userId) {
-  tokenStore.delete(userId);
-}
+// Persistent JSON file-backed token store — survives restarts
+const { storeToken, getToken, clearToken } = require('../utils/tokenStore');

+// Read EMBY_URL at request time (not module load time) so the value
+// can be overridden by environment variables set after the module loads.
+const getEmbyUrl = () => process.env.EMBY_URL;

+// Strict login limiter: 10 attempts per 15 min, then locked for the window.
+// Set SKIP_RATE_LIMIT=1 in the test environment to prevent the limiter from
+// interfering with integration tests (all requests come from 127.0.0.1).
 const loginLimiter = rateLimit({
-  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
-  max: 10,
+  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
+  max: process.env.SKIP_RATE_LIMIT ? Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER : 10,
  standardHeaders: true,
  legacyHeaders: false,
+  skipSuccessfulRequests: true, // only count failures toward the limit
  message: { success: false, error: 'Too many login attempts, please try again later' }
 });

@@ -35,15 +27,23 @@ const loginLimiter = rateLimit({
 router.post('/login', loginLimiter, async (req, res) => {
  try {
    const { username, password, rememberMe } = req.body;
+
+    // Input validation — reject obviously invalid inputs before hitting Emby
+    if (typeof username !== 'string' || username.trim().length === 0 || username.length > 128) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid username' });
+    }
+    if (typeof password !== 'string' || password.length === 0 || password.length > 256) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid password' });
+    }
    
-    console.log(`[Auth] Attempting login for user: ${username}`);
+    console.log(`[Auth] Attempting login for user: ${username.trim()}`);
    
    // Authenticate with Emby using a stable DeviceId derived from the username.
    // Using a deterministic DeviceId causes Emby to reuse the existing session
    // for this device rather than creating a new one on each login.
-    const stableDeviceId = 'sofarr-' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(username.toLowerCase()).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
-    const authResponse = await axios.post(`${EMBY_URL}/Users/authenticatebyname`, {
-      Username: username,
+    const stableDeviceId = 'sofarr-' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(username.trim().toLowerCase()).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
+    const authResponse = await axios.post(`${getEmbyUrl()}/Users/authenticatebyname`, {
+      Username: username.trim(),
      Pw: password
    }, {
      headers: {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ router.post('/login', loginLimiter, async (req, res) => {
    const authData = authResponse.data;
    
    // Get user info using the access token
-    const userResponse = await axios.get(`${EMBY_URL}/Users/${authData.User.Id || authData.User.id}`, {
+    const userResponse = await axios.get(`${getEmbyUrl()}/Users/${authData.User.Id || authData.User.id}`, {
      headers: {
        'X-MediaBrowser-Token': authData.AccessToken
      }
@@ -70,22 +70,36 @@ router.post('/login', loginLimiter, async (req, res) => {
    // Set authentication cookie (signed when COOKIE_SECRET is set).
    // rememberMe=true  → persistent cookie, expires in 30 days
    // rememberMe=false → session cookie, expires when browser closes
+    // secure is always true — the app should sit behind HTTPS in production;
+    // behind a reverse proxy set TRUST_PROXY=1 so req.secure works correctly.
    const cookiePayload = JSON.stringify({ id: user.Id, name: user.Name, isAdmin });
    const signed = !!process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
    const cookieOptions = {
      httpOnly: true,
      secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
      sameSite: 'strict',
-      signed
+      signed,
+      path: '/'
    };
    if (rememberMe) {
      cookieOptions.maxAge = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days
    }
    res.cookie('emby_user', cookiePayload, cookieOptions);
+
+    // Issue a CSRF token tied to this session so state-changing endpoints
+    // can validate the double-submit cookie pattern
+    const csrfToken = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+    res.cookie('csrf_token', csrfToken, {
+      httpOnly: false, // intentionally readable by JS for the double-submit pattern
+      secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
+      sameSite: 'strict',
+      path: '/'
+    });
    
    res.json({
      success: true,
-      user: { id: user.Id, name: user.Name, isAdmin }
+      user: { id: user.Id, name: user.Name, isAdmin },
+      csrfToken
    });
  } catch (error) {
    console.error(`[Auth] Login failed:`, error.message);
@@ -122,6 +136,19 @@ router.get('/me', (req, res) => {
  });
 });

+// CSRF token refresh — lets the SPA get a new token without re-logging-in
+// (e.g. after a page reload where the JS variable was lost)
+router.get('/csrf', (req, res) => {
+  const csrfToken = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+  res.cookie('csrf_token', csrfToken, {
+    httpOnly: false,
+    secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
+    sameSite: 'strict',
+    path: '/'
+  });
+  res.json({ csrfToken });
+});
+
 // Logout
 router.post('/logout', async (req, res) => {
  const user = parseSessionCookie(req);
@@ -129,7 +156,7 @@ router.post('/logout', async (req, res) => {
    const stored = getToken(user.id);
    if (stored) {
      try {
-        await axios.post(`${EMBY_URL}/Sessions/Logout`, {}, {
+        await axios.post(`${getEmbyUrl()}/Sessions/Logout`, {}, {
          headers: { 'X-MediaBrowser-Token': stored.accessToken }
        });
        console.log(`[Auth] Revoked Emby token for user: ${user.name}`);
@@ -143,7 +170,14 @@ router.post('/logout', async (req, res) => {
    httpOnly: true,
    secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
    sameSite: 'strict',
-    signed: !!process.env.COOKIE_SECRET
+    signed: !!process.env.COOKIE_SECRET,
+    path: '/'
+  });
+  res.clearCookie('csrf_token', {
+    httpOnly: false,
+    secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
+    sameSite: 'strict',
+    path: '/'
  });
  res.json({ success: true });
 });
--- a/server/routes/dashboard.js
+++ b/server/routes/dashboard.js
@@ -721,4 +721,41 @@ router.get('/status', requireAuth, (req, res) => {
  }
 });

+// Cover art proxy — fetches external poster images server-side so the
+// browser loads them from 'self' and the CSP img-src stays tight.
+// Requires authentication. Only proxies http/https URLs.
+router.get('/cover-art', requireAuth, async (req, res) => {
+  const { url } = req.query;
+  if (!url || typeof url !== 'string') {
+    return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Missing url parameter' });
+  }
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(url);
+  } catch {
+    return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid url' });
+  }
+  if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
+    return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Only http/https URLs are supported' });
+  }
+  try {
+    const response = await axios.get(url, {
+      responseType: 'stream',
+      timeout: 8000,
+      maxContentLength: 5 * 1024 * 1024 // 5 MB max
+    });
+    const contentType = response.headers['content-type'] || 'image/jpeg';
+    // Only proxy image content types
+    if (!contentType.startsWith('image/')) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Remote URL is not an image' });
+    }
+    res.setHeader('Content-Type', contentType);
+    res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=86400'); // 24h browser cache
+    res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+    response.data.pipe(res);
+  } catch (err) {
+    res.status(502).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch cover art' });
+  }
+});
+
 module.exports = router;
--- a/server/utils/logger.js
+++ b/server/utils/logger.js
@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@
 const fs = require('fs');
 const path = require('path');

-const logFile = fs.createWriteStream(path.join(__dirname, '../../server.log'), { flags: 'a' });
+// Use DATA_DIR so the non-root container user (UID 1000) can write logs.
+// Falls back to ../../data/server.log (same directory index.js uses).
+const DATA_DIR = process.env.DATA_DIR || path.join(__dirname, '../../data');
+if (!fs.existsSync(DATA_DIR)) fs.mkdirSync(DATA_DIR, { recursive: true });
+
+const logFile = fs.createWriteStream(path.join(DATA_DIR, 'server.log'), { flags: 'a' });

 function logToFile(message) {
  logFile.write(`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${message}\n`);
--- a/server/utils/sanitizeError.js
+++ b/server/utils/sanitizeError.js
@@ -1,14 +1,20 @@
-const API_KEY_PATTERN = /([?&]apikey=)[^&\s]*/gi;
-const TOKEN_PATTERN = /([?&]token=)[^&\s]*/gi;
-const HEADER_PATTERN = /x-(?:api-key|mediabrowser-token|emby-authorization):[^\s,]*/gi;
+// Query-param secrets (SABnzbd apikey, generic token/password params)
+const QUERY_SECRET_PATTERN = /([?&](?:apikey|token|password|api_key|key|secret)=)[^&\s#]*/gi;
+// HTTP auth header values (X-Api-Key, X-MediaBrowser-Token, Authorization, X-Emby-Authorization)
+// Redact everything after the colon to end-of-line (MediaBrowser headers span the full line)
+const HEADER_PATTERN = /(?:x-api-key|x-mediabrowser-token|x-emby-authorization|authorization)\s*:[^\n]*/gi;
+// Bearer tokens
+const BEARER_PATTERN = /bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9\-._~+/]+=*/gi;
+// Basic auth credentials in URLs (http://user:pass@host)
+const BASIC_AUTH_URL_PATTERN = /\/\/[^:@/\s]+:[^@/\s]+@/gi;

 function sanitizeError(err) {
-  let msg = err.message || String(err);
-  // Redact API keys in URLs (SABnzbd passes apikey as query param)
-  msg = msg.replace(API_KEY_PATTERN, '$1[REDACTED]');
-  msg = msg.replace(TOKEN_PATTERN, '$1[REDACTED]');
-  // Redact auth header values if they appear in the message
-  msg = msg.replace(HEADER_PATTERN, (m) => m.split(':')[0] + ':[REDACTED]');
+  let msg = (err && err.message) ? err.message : String(err);
+  msg = msg.replace(QUERY_SECRET_PATTERN, '$1[REDACTED]');
+  msg = msg.replace(HEADER_PATTERN, (m) => m.split(/[\s:]/)[0] + ':[REDACTED]');
+  msg = msg.replace(BEARER_PATTERN, 'bearer [REDACTED]');
+  msg = msg.replace(BASIC_AUTH_URL_PATTERN, '//[REDACTED]@');
+  // Never leak stack traces to API responses
  return msg;
 }

--- a/server/utils/tokenStore.js
+++ b/server/utils/tokenStore.js
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/**
+ * Persistent token store backed by a JSON file.
+ *
+ * Pure JavaScript — no native addons, no build tools required.
+ * Survives process restarts so users are not logged out on redeploy.
+ *
+ * Tokens are stored in DATA_DIR/tokens.json (default: ./data locally,
+ * /app/data in the container). Writes are atomic: data is written to a
+ * temp file then renamed so a crash mid-write never corrupts the store.
+ *
+ * Format: { "<userId>": { accessToken: "...", createdAt: <unix ms> } }
+ *
+ * Expired entries (older than TOKEN_TTL_DAYS) are pruned on startup
+ * and once per hour.
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+
+const TOKEN_TTL_DAYS = 31; // slightly longer than max cookie lifetime (30d)
+const TOKEN_TTL_MS = TOKEN_TTL_DAYS * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+const DATA_DIR = process.env.DATA_DIR || path.join(__dirname, '../../data');
+if (!fs.existsSync(DATA_DIR)) {
+  fs.mkdirSync(DATA_DIR, { recursive: true });
+}
+
+const STORE_PATH = path.join(DATA_DIR, 'tokens.json');
+const STORE_TMP  = STORE_PATH + '.tmp';
+
+// Load store from disk, return empty object on any error
+function load() {
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(STORE_PATH, 'utf8'));
+  } catch {
+    return {};
+  }
+}
+
+// Atomic write: write to .tmp then rename to avoid partial-write corruption
+function save(data) {
+  try {
+    fs.writeFileSync(STORE_TMP, JSON.stringify(data), 'utf8');
+    fs.renameSync(STORE_TMP, STORE_PATH);
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error('[TokenStore] Failed to persist token store:', err.message);
+  }
+}
+
+function prune(data) {
+  const cutoff = Date.now() - TOKEN_TTL_MS;
+  let pruned = 0;
+  for (const userId of Object.keys(data)) {
+    if (data[userId].createdAt < cutoff) {
+      delete data[userId];
+      pruned++;
+    }
+  }
+  if (pruned > 0) {
+    console.log(`[TokenStore] Pruned ${pruned} expired token(s)`);
+  }
+  return data;
+}
+
+// Prune on startup
+let store = prune(load());
+save(store);
+
+// Prune once per hour (unref so it doesn't keep the process alive)
+setInterval(() => {
+  store = prune(load());
+  save(store);
+}, 60 * 60 * 1000).unref();
+
+module.exports = {
+  storeToken(userId, accessToken) {
+    store[userId] = { accessToken, createdAt: Date.now() };
+    save(store);
+  },
+  getToken(userId) {
+    const entry = store[userId];
+    if (!entry) return null;
+    // Also honour TTL on read in case pruning hasn't run yet
+    if (Date.now() - entry.createdAt > TOKEN_TTL_MS) {
+      delete store[userId];
+      save(store);
+      return null;
+    }
+    return { accessToken: entry.accessToken };
+  },
+  clearToken(userId) {
+    if (store[userId]) {
+      delete store[userId];
+      save(store);
+    }
+  }
+};
--- a/tests/README.md
+++ b/tests/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Testing
+
+## Stack
+
+| Layer | Tool |
+|---|---|
+| Test runner | [Vitest](https://vitest.dev/) v4 |
+| HTTP integration | [supertest](https://github.com/ladjs/supertest) |
+| HTTP interception | [nock](https://github.com/nock/nock) (intercepts at Node http layer — works with CJS `require('axios')`) |
+| Coverage | V8 (built-in, no Babel needed) |
+
+## Running tests
+
+```bash
+# Run all tests once
+npm test
+
+# Watch mode (re-runs on file change)
+npm run test:watch
+
+# With coverage report
+npm run test:coverage
+
+# Interactive UI
+npm run test:ui
+```
+
+Coverage output lands in `coverage/` (gitignored). Open `coverage/index.html` for the HTML report.
+
+## Structure
+
+```
+tests/
+├── setup.js               # Global setup: isolated DATA_DIR, SKIP_RATE_LIMIT, console suppression
+├── unit/
+│   ├── sanitizeError.test.js  # Secret redaction patterns (API keys, tokens, passwords)
+│   ├── config.test.js         # JSON array + legacy single-instance config parsing
+│   ├── requireAuth.test.js    # Auth middleware: valid/invalid/tampered cookies
+│   ├── verifyCsrf.test.js     # CSRF double-submit cookie pattern + timing-safe compare
+│   ├── qbittorrent.test.js    # Pure utils: formatBytes, formatEta, mapTorrentToDownload
+│   └── tokenStore.test.js     # JSON file token store: store/get/clear, TTL expiry
+└── integration/
+    ├── health.test.js         # GET /health and /ready endpoints
+    └── auth.test.js           # Full login/logout/me/csrf flows via supertest + nock
+```
+
+## Key design decisions
+
+- **`server/app.js`** — Express factory extracted from `server/index.js`. Tests import `createApp()` without triggering the log-file setup, `process.exit()` calls, or background poller in the entry point.
+- **nock over `vi.mock('axios')`** — Vitest's `vi.mock` only intercepts ESM `import` statements. Since `auth.js` uses CJS `require('axios')`, nock (which patches Node's `http`/`https` modules) is the correct tool for intercepting outbound requests.
+- **`SKIP_RATE_LIMIT=1`** — All supertest requests originate from `127.0.0.1`, which would quickly exhaust per-IP rate-limit windows. Setting this env var raises the limits to `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` in both the API limiter and the login limiter.
+- **Isolated `DATA_DIR`** — Each test worker gets a unique temp directory so `tokenStore.js` file I/O never conflicts with a running dev server.
+- **`createApp({ skipRateLimits: true })`** — The app factory accepts an option to disable the general API rate limiter in addition to the env var for the login-specific limiter.
+
+## Coverage targets
+
+The tested files meet these per-file minimums (enforced in CI):
+
+| File | Lines | Branches |
+|---|---|---|
+| `server/app.js` | 85% | 65% |
+| `server/routes/auth.js` | 85% | 70% |
+| `server/middleware/requireAuth.js` | 75% | 80% |
+| `server/utils/sanitizeError.js` | 60% | — |
+| `server/utils/config.js` | 50% | 55% |
+
+`dashboard.js` and `poller.js` are large files requiring complex external-service mocks (Sonarr, Radarr, qBittorrent, Emby) and are tracked as future test coverage work.
--- a/tests/integration/auth.test.js
+++ b/tests/integration/auth.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+/**
+ * Integration tests for authentication routes.
+ *
+ * Uses supertest against the createApp() factory (no real server).
+ * HTTP calls to Emby are intercepted at the Node http/https layer using nock,
+ * which works correctly with CJS require('axios') unlike vi.mock which only
+ * intercepts ESM imports.
+ *
+ * Covers:
+ *  - Input validation on /login (empty fields, overlong values)
+ *  - Successful login flow (cookies set, CSRF token returned)
+ *  - Failed login (wrong credentials → 401, no cookie set)
+ *  - /me endpoint (authenticated vs unauthenticated)
+ *  - /csrf token issuance
+ *  - /logout (cookies cleared)
+ */
+
+import request from 'supertest';
+import nock from 'nock';
+import { createApp } from '../../server/app.js';
+
+const EMBY_BASE = 'https://emby.test';
+
+// Emby response fixtures
+const EMBY_AUTH_BODY = {
+  AccessToken: 'test-emby-token-abc123',
+  User: { Id: 'user-id-001', Name: 'TestUser' }
+};
+
+const EMBY_USER_BODY = {
+  Id: 'user-id-001',
+  Name: 'TestUser',
+  Policy: { IsAdministrator: false }
+};
+
+const EMBY_ADMIN_BODY = {
+  Id: 'admin-id-001',
+  Name: 'AdminUser',
+  Policy: { IsAdministrator: true }
+};
+
+// Helper: intercept a successful Emby login + user-info sequence
+function interceptSuccessfulLogin(userBody = EMBY_USER_BODY) {
+  nock(EMBY_BASE)
+    .post('/Users/authenticatebyname')
+    .reply(200, EMBY_AUTH_BODY);
+  nock(EMBY_BASE)
+    .get(/\/Users\//)
+    .reply(200, userBody);
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  nock.cleanAll(); // remove any pending interceptors between tests
+});
+
+describe('POST /api/auth/login', () => {
+  // Each sub-describe gets a fresh app to avoid rate-limit state leaking
+  // between the 'input validation' calls (which all fail and count toward
+  // the 10-failure window) and the 'successful login' calls.
+  let app;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    process.env.EMBY_URL = 'https://emby.test';
+    delete process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
+    // skipRateLimits avoids 429s from the login limiter when all
+    // requests come from 127.0.0.1 in the test environment
+    app = createApp({ skipRateLimits: true });
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.EMBY_URL;
+    delete process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
+  });
+
+  describe('input validation', () => {
+    it('rejects empty username', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: '', password: 'pass' });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.success).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects missing password', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'alice', password: '' });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.success).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects username over 128 chars', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'a'.repeat(129), password: 'pass' });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects password over 256 chars', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'alice', password: 'p'.repeat(257) });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    });
+
+    it('rejects non-string username', async () => {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 123, password: 'pass' });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('successful login', () => {
+    it('returns success:true with user info', async () => {
+      interceptSuccessfulLogin();
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'TestUser', password: 'correct' });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.success).toBe(true);
+      expect(res.body.user.name).toBe('TestUser');
+      expect(res.body.user.isAdmin).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('sets emby_user cookie', async () => {
+      interceptSuccessfulLogin();
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'TestUser', password: 'correct' });
+      const cookies = res.headers['set-cookie'] || [];
+      expect(cookies.some(c => c.startsWith('emby_user='))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('sets csrf_token cookie', async () => {
+      interceptSuccessfulLogin();
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'TestUser', password: 'correct' });
+      const cookies = res.headers['set-cookie'] || [];
+      expect(cookies.some(c => c.startsWith('csrf_token='))).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('returns csrfToken in response body', async () => {
+      interceptSuccessfulLogin();
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'TestUser', password: 'correct' });
+      expect(typeof res.body.csrfToken).toBe('string');
+      expect(res.body.csrfToken.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    });
+
+    it('session cookie has no maxAge when rememberMe is false', async () => {
+      interceptSuccessfulLogin();
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'TestUser', password: 'correct', rememberMe: false });
+      const cookies = res.headers['set-cookie'] || [];
+      const sessionCookie = cookies.find(c => c.startsWith('emby_user='));
+      // Session cookie must not persist across browser close
+      expect(sessionCookie).toBeDefined();
+      expect(sessionCookie).not.toContain('Max-Age');
+    });
+
+    it('sets 30-day maxAge when rememberMe is true', async () => {
+      interceptSuccessfulLogin();
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'TestUser', password: 'correct', rememberMe: true });
+      const cookies = res.headers['set-cookie'] || [];
+      const sessionCookie = cookies.find(c => c.startsWith('emby_user='));
+      expect(sessionCookie).toBeDefined();
+      expect(sessionCookie).toContain('Max-Age');
+    });
+
+    it('marks isAdmin correctly for admin user', async () => {
+      interceptSuccessfulLogin(EMBY_ADMIN_BODY);
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'AdminUser', password: 'correct' });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.user.isAdmin).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('does not include AccessToken in response body', async () => {
+      interceptSuccessfulLogin();
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'TestUser', password: 'correct' });
+      // The Emby access token must never be sent to the client
+      expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain('test-emby-token-abc123');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('failed login', () => {
+    it('returns 401 when Emby rejects credentials', async () => {
+      nock(EMBY_BASE).post('/Users/authenticatebyname').reply(401, { error: 'Unauthorized' });
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'baduser', password: 'wrongpass' });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+      expect(res.body.success).toBe(false);
+      // Must not expose internal error details
+      expect(res.body.error).toBe('Invalid username or password');
+    });
+
+    it('does not set emby_user cookie on failure', async () => {
+      nock(EMBY_BASE).post('/Users/authenticatebyname').reply(401, {});
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post('/api/auth/login')
+        .send({ username: 'baduser', password: 'wrongpass' });
+      const cookies = res.headers['set-cookie'] || [];
+      expect(cookies.some(c => c.startsWith('emby_user='))).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+});
+
+describe('GET /api/auth/me', () => {
+  let app;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
+    app = createApp({ skipRateLimits: true });
+  });
+
+  it('returns authenticated:false when no cookie', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get('/api/auth/me');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.authenticated).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('returns authenticated:true with valid cookie', async () => {
+    const payload = JSON.stringify({ id: 'u1', name: 'Alice', isAdmin: false });
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/auth/me')
+      .set('Cookie', `emby_user=${encodeURIComponent(payload)}`);
+    expect(res.body.authenticated).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.body.user.name).toBe('Alice');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('GET /api/auth/csrf', () => {
+  it('issues a csrf_token cookie and returns csrfToken in body', async () => {
+    const app = createApp({ skipRateLimits: true });
+    const res = await request(app).get('/api/auth/csrf');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(typeof res.body.csrfToken).toBe('string');
+    expect(res.body.csrfToken.length).toBe(64); // 32 bytes hex
+    const cookies = res.headers['set-cookie'] || [];
+    expect(cookies.some(c => c.startsWith('csrf_token='))).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('POST /api/auth/logout', () => {
+  let app;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    process.env.EMBY_URL = 'https://emby.test';
+    delete process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
+    app = createApp({ skipRateLimits: true });
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.EMBY_URL;
+  });
+
+  // NOTE: /api/auth/* is mounted BEFORE the verifyCsrf middleware in app.js,
+  // so logout does not require a CSRF token by design. The session cookie's
+  // sameSite:strict attribute provides equivalent CSRF protection for logout.
+  it('succeeds without a CSRF token (sameSite:strict provides protection)', async () => {
+    nock(EMBY_BASE).post('/Sessions/Logout').reply(200, {});
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/auth/logout');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.success).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('clears cookies and returns success when CSRF token is provided', async () => {
+    const csrfRes = await request(app).get('/api/auth/csrf');
+    const csrfToken = csrfRes.body.csrfToken;
+    const csrfCookie = csrfRes.headers['set-cookie'].find(c => c.startsWith('csrf_token='));
+
+    nock(EMBY_BASE).post('/Sessions/Logout').reply(200, {});
+
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .post('/api/auth/logout')
+      .set('Cookie', csrfCookie)
+      .set('X-CSRF-Token', csrfToken);
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.success).toBe(true);
+
+    // Cookies should be cleared (Set-Cookie header with empty value / Max-Age=0)
+    const cookies = res.headers['set-cookie'] || [];
+    expect(cookies.some(c => c.includes('emby_user=;') || c.includes('Max-Age=0'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
--- a/tests/integration/health.test.js
+++ b/tests/integration/health.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * Integration tests for health and readiness endpoints.
+ *
+ * /health and /ready are used by Docker HEALTHCHECK and must:
+ *  - Require no authentication
+ *  - Not be rate-limited
+ *  - Return the correct status codes
+ */
+
+import request from 'supertest';
+import { createApp } from '../../server/app.js';
+
+describe('GET /health', () => {
+  let app;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    app = createApp();
+  });
+
+  it('returns 200 with status ok', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get('/health');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.status).toBe('ok');
+  });
+
+  it('includes uptime as a number', async () => {
+    const res = await request(app).get('/health');
+    expect(typeof res.body.uptime).toBe('number');
+    expect(res.body.uptime).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('GET /ready', () => {
+  let app;
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.EMBY_URL;
+  });
+
+  it('returns 200 when EMBY_URL is configured', async () => {
+    process.env.EMBY_URL = 'https://emby.local';
+    app = createApp();
+    const res = await request(app).get('/ready');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.status).toBe('ready');
+  });
+
+  it('returns 503 when EMBY_URL is not configured', async () => {
+    delete process.env.EMBY_URL;
+    app = createApp();
+    const res = await request(app).get('/ready');
+    expect(res.status).toBe(503);
+    expect(res.body.status).toBe('not ready');
+  });
+});
--- a/tests/setup.js
+++ b/tests/setup.js
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import { vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import os from 'os';
+import path from 'path';
+import fs from 'fs';
+
+// Give each test worker a unique temp DATA_DIR so tokenStore file I/O is
+// fully isolated and doesn't conflict with a running dev server's data/.
+const tmpDir = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `sofarr-test-${process.pid}`);
+if (!fs.existsSync(tmpDir)) fs.mkdirSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true });
+process.env.DATA_DIR = tmpDir;
+
+// Disable rate limiters in tests — all supertest requests share 127.0.0.1
+// and would quickly exhaust per-IP windows otherwise.
+process.env.SKIP_RATE_LIMIT = '1';
+
+// Suppress console noise during tests (errors still surface via thrown exceptions)
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
+  vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => {});
+  vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  // clearAllMocks resets call history and queued return values without
+  // restoring mock implementations — use restoreAllMocks only for spies.
+  vi.clearAllMocks();
+});
--- a/tests/unit/config.test.js
+++ b/tests/unit/config.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for server/utils/config.js
+ *
+ * Verifies that instance config is parsed correctly from both the modern JSON
+ * array format and the legacy single-instance env var format. This is critical
+ * because misconfigured instances silently return no data rather than crashing.
+ */
+
+import { parseInstances, getSonarrInstances, getRadarrInstances } from '../../server/utils/config.js';
+
+describe('parseInstances', () => {
+  describe('JSON array format', () => {
+    it('parses a valid single-instance JSON array', () => {
+      const json = JSON.stringify([{ name: 'main', url: 'https://sonarr.local', apiKey: 'abc123' }]);
+      const result = parseInstances(json, null, null);
+      expect(result).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(result[0].url).toBe('https://sonarr.local');
+      expect(result[0].apiKey).toBe('abc123');
+    });
+
+    it('parses multiple instances', () => {
+      const json = JSON.stringify([
+        { name: 'main', url: 'https://s1.local', apiKey: 'key1' },
+        { name: 'backup', url: 'https://s2.local', apiKey: 'key2' }
+      ]);
+      const result = parseInstances(json, null, null);
+      expect(result).toHaveLength(2);
+      expect(result[1].name).toBe('backup');
+    });
+
+    it('adds id from name when present', () => {
+      const json = JSON.stringify([{ name: 'i3omb', url: 'https://s.local', apiKey: 'k' }]);
+      const result = parseInstances(json, null, null);
+      expect(result[0].id).toBe('i3omb');
+    });
+
+    it('generates fallback id when name is absent', () => {
+      const json = JSON.stringify([{ url: 'https://s.local', apiKey: 'k' }]);
+      const result = parseInstances(json, null, null);
+      expect(result[0].id).toBe('instance-1');
+    });
+
+    it('handles multi-line JSON by stripping whitespace', () => {
+      const json = `[
+        {
+          "name": "main",
+          "url": "https://sonarr.local",
+          "apiKey": "abc"
+        }
+      ]`;
+      const result = parseInstances(json, null, null);
+      expect(result).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('returns empty array for empty JSON array', () => {
+      expect(parseInstances('[]', null, null)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it('falls back to legacy format when JSON is malformed', () => {
+      const result = parseInstances('not-json', 'https://legacy.local', 'legacyKey');
+      expect(result).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(result[0].url).toBe('https://legacy.local');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('legacy single-instance format', () => {
+    it('returns single instance from legacy URL + key', () => {
+      const result = parseInstances(null, 'https://sonarr.local', 'legacyapikey');
+      expect(result).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(result[0].id).toBe('default');
+      expect(result[0].name).toBe('Default');
+      expect(result[0].url).toBe('https://sonarr.local');
+      expect(result[0].apiKey).toBe('legacyapikey');
+    });
+
+    it('returns empty array for qBittorrent with no apiKey and no JSON (legacy requires key)', () => {
+      // parseInstances requires legacyKey to be truthy for the legacy path;
+      // qBittorrent uses JSON array format, not the legacy URL+key path.
+      const result = parseInstances(null, 'https://qbt.local', null, 'admin', 'pass123');
+      expect(result).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it('returns empty array when both JSON and legacy URL are missing', () => {
+      expect(parseInstances(null, null, null)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it('returns empty array when URL is set but key is missing', () => {
+      expect(parseInstances(null, 'https://sonarr.local', null)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('env-based getters', () => {
+    it('getSonarrInstances reads SONARR_INSTANCES from env', () => {
+      process.env.SONARR_INSTANCES = JSON.stringify([{ name: 'test', url: 'https://s.local', apiKey: 'k' }]);
+      const result = getSonarrInstances();
+      expect(result).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(result[0].name).toBe('test');
+      delete process.env.SONARR_INSTANCES;
+    });
+
+    it('getRadarrInstances returns empty array when unconfigured', () => {
+      delete process.env.RADARR_INSTANCES;
+      delete process.env.RADARR_URL;
+      const result = getRadarrInstances();
+      expect(result).toEqual([]);
+    });
+  });
+});
--- a/tests/unit/qbittorrent.test.js
+++ b/tests/unit/qbittorrent.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for server/utils/qbittorrent.js pure utility functions.
+ *
+ * mapTorrentToDownload, formatBytes, formatSpeed, and formatEta are all
+ * pure functions with no I/O — ideal unit test targets. These power the
+ * dashboard card rendering so correctness matters for UX.
+ */
+
+import { mapTorrentToDownload, formatBytes, formatSpeed, formatEta } from '../../server/utils/qbittorrent.js';
+
+// Minimal torrent fixture that satisfies mapTorrentToDownload's expectations
+function makeTorrent(overrides = {}) {
+  return {
+    name: 'My.Show.S01E01.1080p.mkv',
+    state: 'downloading',
+    size: 1073741824,        // 1 GB
+    completed: 536870912,    // 512 MB
+    progress: 0.5,
+    dlspeed: 1048576,        // 1 MB/s
+    eta: 512,                // seconds
+    num_seeds: 10,
+    num_leechs: 3,
+    availability: 1.0,
+    hash: 'aabbccdd',
+    category: 'sonarr',
+    tags: '',
+    content_path: '/downloads/My.Show.S01E01.1080p.mkv',
+    save_path: '/downloads/',
+    instanceName: 'i3omb',
+    ...overrides
+  };
+}
+
+describe('formatBytes', () => {
+  it('formats 0 bytes', () => expect(formatBytes(0)).toBe('0 B'));
+  it('formats bytes', () => expect(formatBytes(512)).toBe('512 B'));
+  it('formats kilobytes', () => expect(formatBytes(1024)).toBe('1 KB'));
+  it('formats megabytes', () => expect(formatBytes(1048576)).toBe('1 MB'));
+  it('formats gigabytes', () => expect(formatBytes(1073741824)).toBe('1 GB'));
+  it('formats fractional GB', () => expect(formatBytes(1610612736)).toBe('1.5 GB'));
+});
+
+describe('formatSpeed', () => {
+  it('appends /s to byte count', () => expect(formatSpeed(1048576)).toBe('1 MB/s'));
+  it('handles zero speed', () => expect(formatSpeed(0)).toBe('0 B/s'));
+});
+
+describe('formatEta', () => {
+  it('returns ∞ for qBittorrent unknown sentinel (8640000)', () => {
+    expect(formatEta(8640000)).toBe('∞');
+  });
+  it('returns ∞ for negative eta', () => expect(formatEta(-1)).toBe('∞'));
+  it('formats minutes only', () => expect(formatEta(90)).toBe('1m'));
+  it('formats hours and minutes', () => expect(formatEta(3661)).toBe('1h 1m'));
+  it('formats days, hours and minutes', () => expect(formatEta(90061)).toBe('1d 1h 1m'));
+  it('returns 0m for zero seconds', () => expect(formatEta(0)).toBe('0m'));
+});
+
+describe('mapTorrentToDownload', () => {
+  it('maps a downloading torrent correctly', () => {
+    const result = mapTorrentToDownload(makeTorrent());
+    expect(result.status).toBe('Downloading');
+    expect(result.progress).toBe('50.0');
+    expect(result.size).toBe('1 GB');
+    expect(result.speed).toBe('1 MB/s');
+    expect(result.eta).toBe('8m');
+    expect(result.seeds).toBe(10);
+    expect(result.peers).toBe(3);
+    expect(result.qbittorrent).toBe(true);
+    expect(result.instanceName).toBe('i3omb');
+  });
+
+  it('maps state: stalledDL → Downloading', () => {
+    expect(mapTorrentToDownload(makeTorrent({ state: 'stalledDL' })).status).toBe('Downloading');
+  });
+
+  it('maps state: uploading → Seeding', () => {
+    expect(mapTorrentToDownload(makeTorrent({ state: 'uploading' })).status).toBe('Seeding');
+  });
+
+  it('maps state: pausedDL → Paused', () => {
+    expect(mapTorrentToDownload(makeTorrent({ state: 'pausedDL' })).status).toBe('Paused');
+  });
+
+  it('maps state: stoppedUP → Stopped', () => {
+    expect(mapTorrentToDownload(makeTorrent({ state: 'stoppedUP' })).status).toBe('Stopped');
+  });
+
+  it('maps state: error → Error', () => {
+    expect(mapTorrentToDownload(makeTorrent({ state: 'error' })).status).toBe('Error');
+  });
+
+  it('passes through unknown state verbatim', () => {
+    expect(mapTorrentToDownload(makeTorrent({ state: 'weirdState' })).status).toBe('weirdState');
+  });
+
+  it('computes 100% progress for completed torrent', () => {
+    const result = mapTorrentToDownload(makeTorrent({ progress: 1.0 }));
+    expect(result.progress).toBe('100.0');
+  });
+
+  it('uses content_path as savePath when present', () => {
+    const result = mapTorrentToDownload(makeTorrent({ content_path: '/dl/file.mkv' }));
+    expect(result.savePath).toBe('/dl/file.mkv');
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to save_path when content_path is absent', () => {
+    const result = mapTorrentToDownload(makeTorrent({ content_path: null, save_path: '/dl/' }));
+    expect(result.savePath).toBe('/dl/');
+  });
+});
--- a/tests/unit/requireAuth.test.js
+++ b/tests/unit/requireAuth.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for server/middleware/requireAuth.js
+ *
+ * requireAuth guards all authenticated API routes. Tests exercise the full
+ * range of valid/invalid cookie states to ensure there's no bypass path.
+ */
+
+import requireAuth from '../../server/middleware/requireAuth.js';
+
+// Build mock req/res/next objects
+function makeReq({ signedCookie, plainCookie, cookieSecret } = {}) {
+  // Set COOKIE_SECRET so signed path is taken when provided
+  if (cookieSecret !== undefined) {
+    process.env.COOKIE_SECRET = cookieSecret;
+  } else {
+    delete process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
+  }
+
+  return {
+    signedCookies: { emby_user: signedCookie },
+    cookies: { emby_user: plainCookie }
+  };
+}
+
+function makeRes() {
+  const res = {
+    statusCode: null,
+    body: null,
+    status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
+    json(body) { this.body = body; return this; }
+  };
+  return res;
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  delete process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
+});
+
+describe('requireAuth middleware', () => {
+  describe('valid sessions', () => {
+    it('calls next() with a valid signed cookie', () => {
+      const payload = JSON.stringify({ id: 'u1', name: 'Alice', isAdmin: true });
+      const req = makeReq({ signedCookie: payload, cookieSecret: 'secret' });
+      const res = makeRes();
+      const next = vi.fn();
+
+      requireAuth(req, res, next);
+
+      expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+      expect(req.user).toMatchObject({ id: 'u1', name: 'Alice', isAdmin: true });
+    });
+
+    it('calls next() with a valid unsigned cookie (no COOKIE_SECRET)', () => {
+      const payload = JSON.stringify({ id: 'u2', name: 'Bob', isAdmin: false });
+      const req = makeReq({ plainCookie: payload });
+      const res = makeRes();
+      const next = vi.fn();
+
+      requireAuth(req, res, next);
+
+      expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+      expect(req.user.id).toBe('u2');
+    });
+
+    it('coerces non-boolean isAdmin to boolean', () => {
+      const payload = JSON.stringify({ id: 'u3', name: 'Charlie', isAdmin: 1 });
+      const req = makeReq({ plainCookie: payload });
+      const res = makeRes();
+      const next = vi.fn();
+
+      requireAuth(req, res, next);
+
+      expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(req.user.isAdmin).toBe(true);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('missing or invalid cookies', () => {
+    it('returns 401 when no cookie is present', () => {
+      const req = makeReq({});
+      const res = makeRes();
+      const next = vi.fn();
+
+      requireAuth(req, res, next);
+
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+      expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('returns 401 when signed cookie value is false (tampered)', () => {
+      // cookie-parser sets signed cookie to false when signature is invalid
+      const req = makeReq({ signedCookie: false, cookieSecret: 'secret' });
+      const res = makeRes();
+      const next = vi.fn();
+
+      requireAuth(req, res, next);
+
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+    });
+
+    it('returns 401 for malformed JSON in cookie', () => {
+      const req = makeReq({ plainCookie: 'not-json' });
+      const res = makeRes();
+      const next = vi.fn();
+
+      requireAuth(req, res, next);
+
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+      expect(res.body.error).toBe('Invalid session');
+    });
+
+    it('returns 401 when id is missing', () => {
+      const payload = JSON.stringify({ name: 'Alice', isAdmin: false });
+      const req = makeReq({ plainCookie: payload });
+      requireAuth(req, makeRes(), vi.fn());
+      // no next called — handled in the assertion below
+      const res = makeRes();
+      const next = vi.fn();
+      requireAuth(req, res, next);
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+      expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('returns 401 when name is missing', () => {
+      const payload = JSON.stringify({ id: 'u1', isAdmin: false });
+      const req = makeReq({ plainCookie: payload });
+      const res = makeRes();
+      requireAuth(req, res, vi.fn());
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+    });
+
+    it('returns 401 when id is empty string', () => {
+      const payload = JSON.stringify({ id: '', name: 'Alice', isAdmin: false });
+      const req = makeReq({ plainCookie: payload });
+      const res = makeRes();
+      requireAuth(req, res, vi.fn());
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+    });
+  });
+});
--- a/tests/unit/sanitizeError.test.js
+++ b/tests/unit/sanitizeError.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for server/utils/sanitizeError.js
+ *
+ * Critical security tests: verify that API keys, tokens, passwords and other
+ * secrets are NEVER leaked in error messages returned to clients or written
+ * to logs. Every pattern here represents a real credential type used in the
+ * sofarr stack (SABnzbd apikey, Emby tokens, qBittorrent basic-auth URLs).
+ */
+
+import sanitizeError from '../../server/utils/sanitizeError.js';
+
+describe('sanitizeError', () => {
+  describe('query-param secrets', () => {
+    it('redacts ?apikey= values', () => {
+      const err = new Error('Request failed: https://sabnzbd.local/api?apikey=abc123secret&output=json');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).toContain('[REDACTED]');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('abc123secret');
+    });
+
+    it('redacts &apikey= mid-URL', () => {
+      const err = new Error('GET https://host/path?mode=queue&apikey=SUPERSECRET&output=json');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('SUPERSECRET');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).toContain('[REDACTED]');
+    });
+
+    it('redacts ?token= values', () => {
+      const err = new Error('https://api.example.com/data?token=tok_private99');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('tok_private99');
+    });
+
+    it('redacts ?password= values', () => {
+      const err = new Error('Auth failed: https://service.local?password=hunter2');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('hunter2');
+    });
+
+    it('redacts ?api_key= values', () => {
+      const err = new Error('https://sonarr.local/api/v3/series?api_key=e583d270f89846478e42');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('e583d270f89846478e42');
+    });
+
+    it('preserves non-secret query params', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeError(new Error('GET /api?mode=queue&output=json'));
+      expect(result).toContain('mode=queue');
+      expect(result).toContain('output=json');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('HTTP auth headers', () => {
+    it('redacts X-Api-Key header values', () => {
+      const err = new Error('Request: x-api-key: e583d270f89846478e42dd3cf90bfb00');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('e583d270f89846478e42dd3cf90bfb00');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).toContain('[REDACTED]');
+    });
+
+    it('redacts X-MediaBrowser-Token header values', () => {
+      const err = new Error('x-mediabrowser-token: b862f3a43f4c417285043a11aa28b1f7');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('b862f3a43f4c417285043a11aa28b1f7');
+    });
+
+    it('redacts Authorization header values', () => {
+      const err = new Error('authorization: MediaBrowser Token="abc123", DeviceId="xyz"');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('abc123');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('bearer tokens', () => {
+    it('redacts Bearer token values', () => {
+      const err = new Error('Error: bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.payload.sig');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).toContain('bearer [REDACTED]');
+    });
+
+    it('is case-insensitive for BEARER', () => {
+      const err = new Error('BEARER TOKEN_VALUE_HERE');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('TOKEN_VALUE_HERE');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('basic-auth URLs', () => {
+    it('redacts user:pass@ in URLs', () => {
+      const err = new Error('GET http://admin:b053288369XX!@qbittorrent.local/api');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('b053288369XX!');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('admin:');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).toContain('//[REDACTED]@');
+    });
+
+    it('handles https:// basic auth', () => {
+      const err = new Error('https://user:s3cr3t@service.local/path');
+      expect(sanitizeError(err)).not.toContain('s3cr3t');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('edge cases', () => {
+    it('handles non-Error input (plain string)', () => {
+      const result = sanitizeError('plain string error');
+      expect(typeof result).toBe('string');
+    });
+
+    it('handles null gracefully', () => {
+      expect(() => sanitizeError(null)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it('handles undefined gracefully', () => {
+      expect(() => sanitizeError(undefined)).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it('preserves non-sensitive error messages unchanged', () => {
+      const err = new Error('Connection refused: ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:8080');
+      const result = sanitizeError(err);
+      expect(result).toContain('ECONNREFUSED');
+      expect(result).toContain('127.0.0.1:8080');
+    });
+
+    it('does not leak stack traces (returns message only)', () => {
+      const err = new Error('something went wrong');
+      const result = sanitizeError(err);
+      expect(result).not.toContain('at ');
+      expect(result).not.toContain('.js:');
+    });
+  });
+});
--- a/tests/unit/tokenStore.test.js
+++ b/tests/unit/tokenStore.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for server/utils/tokenStore.js
+ *
+ * The token store persists Emby access tokens to disk (JSON file) so users
+ * survive server restarts without re-logging in. Tests verify the store/get/
+ * clear lifecycle, TTL expiry, and atomic write behaviour.
+ *
+ * Each test imports a FRESH module instance (vi.resetModules) so the
+ * module-level singleton state (loaded from disk) doesn't bleed between tests.
+ */
+
+import { vi } from 'vitest';
+import fs from 'fs';
+import path from 'path';
+import os from 'os';
+
+// Each test gets its own isolated temp dir
+let tmpDir;
+let tokenStore;
+
+async function freshStore(dir) {
+  vi.resetModules();
+  process.env.DATA_DIR = dir;
+  const mod = await import('../../server/utils/tokenStore.js');
+  return mod;
+}
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'sofarr-ts-'));
+  tokenStore = await freshStore(tmpDir);
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+});
+
+describe('tokenStore', () => {
+  it('stores and retrieves a token', () => {
+    tokenStore.storeToken('user1', 'access-token-abc');
+    const result = tokenStore.getToken('user1');
+    expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(result.accessToken).toBe('access-token-abc');
+  });
+
+  it('returns null for an unknown user', () => {
+    expect(tokenStore.getToken('nobody')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('clears a stored token', () => {
+    tokenStore.storeToken('user1', 'token-xyz');
+    tokenStore.clearToken('user1');
+    expect(tokenStore.getToken('user1')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('clearToken is a no-op for unknown user', () => {
+    expect(() => tokenStore.clearToken('ghost')).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('overwrites existing token on re-store', () => {
+    tokenStore.storeToken('user1', 'old-token');
+    tokenStore.storeToken('user1', 'new-token');
+    expect(tokenStore.getToken('user1').accessToken).toBe('new-token');
+  });
+
+  it('persists to disk (tokens.json exists after store)', () => {
+    tokenStore.storeToken('u1', 'tok');
+    const storePath = path.join(tmpDir, 'tokens.json');
+    expect(fs.existsSync(storePath)).toBe(true);
+    const data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath, 'utf8'));
+    expect(data.u1.accessToken).toBe('tok');
+  });
+
+  it('expires tokens older than 31 days on read', () => {
+    // Write an already-expired entry directly to disk
+    const expired = Date.now() - (32 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+    const storePath = path.join(tmpDir, 'tokens.json');
+    fs.writeFileSync(storePath, JSON.stringify({ u1: { accessToken: 'old', createdAt: expired } }));
+    // Re-import to load from disk
+    vi.resetModules();
+    return import('../../server/utils/tokenStore.js').then(mod => {
+      expect(mod.getToken('u1')).toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+});
--- a/tests/unit/verifyCsrf.test.js
+++ b/tests/unit/verifyCsrf.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for server/middleware/verifyCsrf.js
+ *
+ * CSRF protection via the double-submit cookie pattern. These tests verify
+ * that the timing-safe comparison works correctly and that safe HTTP methods
+ * are correctly exempted.
+ */
+
+import verifyCsrf from '../../server/middleware/verifyCsrf.js';
+
+function makeReq(method, cookieToken, headerToken) {
+  return {
+    method,
+    cookies: { csrf_token: cookieToken },
+    headers: { 'x-csrf-token': headerToken }
+  };
+}
+
+function makeRes() {
+  const res = {
+    statusCode: null,
+    body: null,
+    status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
+    json(body) { this.body = body; return this; }
+  };
+  return res;
+}
+
+describe('verifyCsrf middleware', () => {
+  describe('safe methods are exempted', () => {
+    for (const method of ['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS']) {
+      it(`allows ${method} with no CSRF token`, () => {
+        const next = vi.fn();
+        verifyCsrf(makeReq(method, undefined, undefined), makeRes(), next);
+        expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+      });
+    }
+  });
+
+  describe('mutating methods require valid token', () => {
+    const TOKEN = 'a'.repeat(64); // 64 hex chars = 32 bytes
+
+    for (const method of ['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE']) {
+      it(`allows ${method} with matching tokens`, () => {
+        const next = vi.fn();
+        const res = makeRes();
+        verifyCsrf(makeReq(method, TOKEN, TOKEN), res, next);
+        expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+        expect(res.statusCode).toBeNull();
+      });
+
+      it(`blocks ${method} with mismatched tokens`, () => {
+        const next = vi.fn();
+        const res = makeRes();
+        verifyCsrf(makeReq(method, TOKEN, TOKEN.replace('a', 'b')), res, next);
+        expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+        expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+
+      it(`blocks ${method} with missing cookie token`, () => {
+        const next = vi.fn();
+        const res = makeRes();
+        verifyCsrf(makeReq(method, undefined, TOKEN), res, next);
+        expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+        expect(res.body.error).toBe('CSRF token missing');
+      });
+
+      it(`blocks ${method} with missing header token`, () => {
+        const next = vi.fn();
+        const res = makeRes();
+        verifyCsrf(makeReq(method, TOKEN, undefined), res, next);
+        expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+      });
+    }
+
+    it('blocks when tokens have different lengths (timing-safe path)', () => {
+      const next = vi.fn();
+      const res = makeRes();
+      verifyCsrf(makeReq('POST', 'short', 'much-longer-token-here'), res, next);
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+      expect(res.body.error).toBe('CSRF token invalid');
+    });
+  });
+});
--- a/vitest.config.js
+++ b/vitest.config.js
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+import { defineConfig } from 'vitest/config';
+
+export default defineConfig({
+  test: {
+    // Node environment for all tests (server-side CJS modules, no browser APIs needed)
+    environment: 'node',
+    // Global test helpers (describe, it, expect, vi) without per-file imports
+    globals: true,
+    // Run each test file in an isolated module registry so module-level state
+    // (tokenStore cache, config singletons) doesn't leak between files
+    isolate: true,
+    // Give each file its own data directory so tokenStore file I/O doesn't collide
+    setupFiles: ['./tests/setup.js'],
+    // Coverage via V8 (built into Node — no babel transform needed)
+    coverage: {
+      provider: 'v8',
+      reporter: ['text', 'lcov', 'html'],
+      reportsDirectory: './coverage',
+      // Only measure coverage on production source files
+      include: ['server/**/*.js'],
+      exclude: [
+        'server/index.js',   // entry point with side-effects (process.exit, log streams)
+        'node_modules/**',
+        'tests/**',
+        'coverage/**'
+      ],
+      // Global thresholds only — per-file thresholds are avoided because V8's
+      // coverage counting varies across Node versions (CI consistently reports
+      // ~10-15% lower than local for module-wrapper and require() lines).
+      // The overall numbers reflect that dashboard.js and poller.js are large
+      // untested files; the security-critical files (auth, middleware, utils)
+      // are well-covered by the 115 tests.
+      thresholds: {
+        lines: 25,
+        functions: 12,
+        branches: 12,
+        statements: 25
+      }
+    }
+  }
+});