Gronod
5fd55b4e1a
Framework:
- Vitest v4 as test runner (fast ESM/CJS support, V8 coverage built-in)
- supertest for integration tests against createApp() factory
- nock for HTTP interception (works with CJS require('axios'), unlike vi.mock)
New files:
- vitest.config.js — test config: node env, isolate, V8 coverage, per-file thresholds
- tests/setup.js — isolated DATA_DIR per worker, SKIP_RATE_LIMIT, console suppression
- tests/README.md — approach, structure, design decisions
- server/app.js — testable Express factory (extracted from index.js side-effects)
Unit tests (91 tests):
- tests/unit/sanitizeError.test.js — secret redaction: apikey, token, bearer, basic-auth URLs
- tests/unit/config.test.js — JSON array + legacy single-instance config parsing
- tests/unit/requireAuth.test.js — valid/invalid/tampered cookies, schema validation
- tests/unit/verifyCsrf.test.js — double-submit pattern, timing-safe compare, safe methods
- tests/unit/qbittorrent.test.js — formatBytes, formatEta, mapTorrentToDownload state map
- tests/unit/tokenStore.test.js — store/get/clear lifecycle, TTL expiry, atomic disk write
Integration tests (24 tests):
- tests/integration/health.test.js — /health and /ready endpoints
- tests/integration/auth.test.js — full login/logout/me/csrf flows, input validation,
cookie attributes, no token leakage, Emby mock via nock
Production code changes (minimal, no behaviour change):
- server/routes/auth.js: EMBY_URL captured at request-time (not module load) for testability
- server/routes/auth.js: loginLimiter max → Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER when SKIP_RATE_LIMIT set
- server/utils/sanitizeError.js: fix HEADER_PATTERN to redact full line (not just first token)
CI:
- .gitea/workflows/ci.yml: add parallel 'test' job (npm run test:coverage, artifact upload)
- package.json: add test/test:watch/test:coverage/test:ui scripts
- .gitignore: add coverage/
22 lines
1.1 KiB
JavaScript
22 lines
1.1 KiB
JavaScript
// Query-param secrets (SABnzbd apikey, generic token/password params)
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const QUERY_SECRET_PATTERN = /([?&](?:apikey|token|password|api_key|key|secret)=)[^&\s#]*/gi;
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// HTTP auth header values (X-Api-Key, X-MediaBrowser-Token, Authorization, X-Emby-Authorization)
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// Redact everything after the colon to end-of-line (MediaBrowser headers span the full line)
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const HEADER_PATTERN = /(?:x-api-key|x-mediabrowser-token|x-emby-authorization|authorization)\s*:[^\n]*/gi;
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// Bearer tokens
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const BEARER_PATTERN = /bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9\-._~+/]+=*/gi;
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// Basic auth credentials in URLs (http://user:pass@host)
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const BASIC_AUTH_URL_PATTERN = /\/\/[^:@/\s]+:[^@/\s]+@/gi;
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function sanitizeError(err) {
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let msg = (err && err.message) ? err.message : String(err);
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msg = msg.replace(QUERY_SECRET_PATTERN, '$1[REDACTED]');
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msg = msg.replace(HEADER_PATTERN, (m) => m.split(/[\s:]/)[0] + ':[REDACTED]');
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msg = msg.replace(BEARER_PATTERN, 'bearer [REDACTED]');
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msg = msg.replace(BASIC_AUTH_URL_PATTERN, '//[REDACTED]@');
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// Never leak stack traces to API responses
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return msg;
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}
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module.exports = sanitizeError;
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