Gronod
bdbbcabfbc
Container (Dockerfile):
- Multi-stage build (deps + runtime) for minimal attack surface
- Upgrade base image from node:18-alpine to node:22-alpine
- Run as non-root 'node' user (UID 1000); source files owned by root
- /app/data directory owned by node for SQLite + logs
- Docker HEALTHCHECK: wget /health every 30s
docker-compose.yaml:
- Port bound to 127.0.0.1 only (expose via reverse proxy)
- read_only: true filesystem; /tmp tmpfs for Node.js
- no-new-privileges:true, cap_drop: ALL
- Named volume sofarr-data for persistent data
- TRUST_PROXY, COOKIE_SECRET, NODE_ENV added
Helmet v7 + CSP nonce:
- Upgrade helmet@4 → helmet@7, express-rate-limit@6 → @7
- CSP with per-request nonce injected into index.html script/link tags
(replaces blanket unsafe-inline; nonce changes every request)
- HSTS: max-age=1yr, includeSubDomains, preload
- Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
- Permissions-Policy: camera/mic/geolocation/payment/usb all off
- index.html served dynamically with nonce injection; static assets
served normally via express.static({index:false})
Trust proxy:
- TRUST_PROXY env var configures app.set('trust proxy') so rate
limiting and secure cookies work correctly behind Nginx/Caddy
Session & auth:
- Token store migrated from in-memory Map to SQLite via better-sqlite3
(server/utils/tokenStore.js): survives restarts, WAL mode, 31-day TTL
- CSRF double-submit cookie pattern (server/middleware/verifyCsrf.js):
POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE on /api/* require X-CSRF-Token header matching
the csrf_token cookie; timing-safe comparison
- CSRF token issued on login + GET /api/auth/csrf; cleared on logout
- Login input validation: username/password length + type checked before
hitting Emby
- skipSuccessfulRequests:true on login rate limiter (only count failures)
- express.json({ limit: '64kb' }) to reject oversized payloads
Rate limiting:
- General API limiter: 300 req/15min per IP on all /api/* routes
- Login limiter unchanged (10 failures/15min) but now only counts fails
Logging:
- Log file moved from /app/server.log to DATA_DIR/server.log (writable
by non-root node user in container)
- Size-based rotation: rotate at 10 MB, keep 3 files (server.log.1-3)
- DATA_DIR defaults to ./data locally, /app/data in container
Error handling:
- Global Express error handler: catches unhandled errors, logs message,
returns generic 500 (no stack traces to clients)
Health/readiness:
- GET /health: returns {status:'ok', uptime:N} — used by HEALTHCHECK
- GET /ready: returns 503 if EMBY_URL not configured
Error sanitization (sanitizeError.js):
- Added patterns for password= params, bearer tokens, Basic auth in URLs
Supply chain:
- Remove unused cors dependency
- add better-sqlite3@^9
- CI: upgrade to Node 22, raise audit level to --audit-level=high
- .gitignore: add data/, *.db, *.db-wal, *.db-shm
Docs:
- SECURITY.md: threat model, hardening checklist, proxy examples,
header table, rate limit table, Docker secrets guidance
- .env.example + .env.sample: TRUST_PROXY, DATA_DIR documented
43 lines
1.3 KiB
JavaScript
43 lines
1.3 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* CSRF protection using the double-submit cookie pattern.
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*
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* On login the server issues a random `csrf_token` cookie (httpOnly:false
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* so JS can read it). The SPA must send the same value in the
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* `X-CSRF-Token` request header for every state-changing request (POST,
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* PUT, PATCH, DELETE).
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*
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* Because the `sameSite: strict` session cookie already provides strong
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* protection in modern browsers, this acts as defence-in-depth for
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* older browsers and any edge cases.
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*
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* Safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS) are exempted.
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*/
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const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS']);
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function verifyCsrf(req, res, next) {
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if (SAFE_METHODS.has(req.method)) return next();
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const cookieToken = req.cookies.csrf_token;
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const headerToken = req.headers['x-csrf-token'];
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if (!cookieToken || !headerToken) {
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'CSRF token missing' });
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}
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// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
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if (cookieToken.length !== headerToken.length) {
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'CSRF token invalid' });
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}
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const a = Buffer.from(cookieToken);
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const b = Buffer.from(headerToken);
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if (!require('crypto').timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'CSRF token invalid' });
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}
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next();
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}
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module.exports = verifyCsrf;
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