Container (Dockerfile):
- Multi-stage build (deps + runtime) for minimal attack surface
- Upgrade base image from node:18-alpine to node:22-alpine
- Run as non-root 'node' user (UID 1000); source files owned by root
- /app/data directory owned by node for SQLite + logs
- Docker HEALTHCHECK: wget /health every 30s
docker-compose.yaml:
- Port bound to 127.0.0.1 only (expose via reverse proxy)
- read_only: true filesystem; /tmp tmpfs for Node.js
- no-new-privileges:true, cap_drop: ALL
- Named volume sofarr-data for persistent data
- TRUST_PROXY, COOKIE_SECRET, NODE_ENV added
Helmet v7 + CSP nonce:
- Upgrade helmet@4 → helmet@7, express-rate-limit@6 → @7
- CSP with per-request nonce injected into index.html script/link tags
(replaces blanket unsafe-inline; nonce changes every request)
- HSTS: max-age=1yr, includeSubDomains, preload
- Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
- Permissions-Policy: camera/mic/geolocation/payment/usb all off
- index.html served dynamically with nonce injection; static assets
served normally via express.static({index:false})
Trust proxy:
- TRUST_PROXY env var configures app.set('trust proxy') so rate
limiting and secure cookies work correctly behind Nginx/Caddy
Session & auth:
- Token store migrated from in-memory Map to SQLite via better-sqlite3
(server/utils/tokenStore.js): survives restarts, WAL mode, 31-day TTL
- CSRF double-submit cookie pattern (server/middleware/verifyCsrf.js):
POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE on /api/* require X-CSRF-Token header matching
the csrf_token cookie; timing-safe comparison
- CSRF token issued on login + GET /api/auth/csrf; cleared on logout
- Login input validation: username/password length + type checked before
hitting Emby
- skipSuccessfulRequests:true on login rate limiter (only count failures)
- express.json({ limit: '64kb' }) to reject oversized payloads
Rate limiting:
- General API limiter: 300 req/15min per IP on all /api/* routes
- Login limiter unchanged (10 failures/15min) but now only counts fails
Logging:
- Log file moved from /app/server.log to DATA_DIR/server.log (writable
by non-root node user in container)
- Size-based rotation: rotate at 10 MB, keep 3 files (server.log.1-3)
- DATA_DIR defaults to ./data locally, /app/data in container
Error handling:
- Global Express error handler: catches unhandled errors, logs message,
returns generic 500 (no stack traces to clients)
Health/readiness:
- GET /health: returns {status:'ok', uptime:N} — used by HEALTHCHECK
- GET /ready: returns 503 if EMBY_URL not configured
Error sanitization (sanitizeError.js):
- Added patterns for password= params, bearer tokens, Basic auth in URLs
Supply chain:
- Remove unused cors dependency
- add better-sqlite3@^9
- CI: upgrade to Node 22, raise audit level to --audit-level=high
- .gitignore: add data/, *.db, *.db-wal, *.db-shm
Docs:
- SECURITY.md: threat model, hardening checklist, proxy examples,
header table, rate limit table, Docker secrets guidance
- .env.example + .env.sample: TRUST_PROXY, DATA_DIR documented
183 lines
6.3 KiB
JavaScript
183 lines
6.3 KiB
JavaScript
const express = require('express');
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const axios = require('axios');
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const crypto = require('crypto');
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const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
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const router = express.Router();
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// Persistent SQLite-backed token store — survives restarts
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const { storeToken, getToken, clearToken } = require('../utils/tokenStore');
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const EMBY_URL = process.env.EMBY_URL;
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// Strict login limiter: 10 attempts per 15 min, then locked for the window
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const loginLimiter = rateLimit({
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windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
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max: 10,
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standardHeaders: true,
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legacyHeaders: false,
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skipSuccessfulRequests: true, // only count failures toward the limit
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message: { success: false, error: 'Too many login attempts, please try again later' }
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});
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// Authenticate user with Emby
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router.post('/login', loginLimiter, async (req, res) => {
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try {
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const { username, password, rememberMe } = req.body;
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// Input validation — reject obviously invalid inputs before hitting Emby
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if (typeof username !== 'string' || username.trim().length === 0 || username.length > 128) {
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return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid username' });
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}
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if (typeof password !== 'string' || password.length === 0 || password.length > 256) {
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return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid password' });
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}
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console.log(`[Auth] Attempting login for user: ${username.trim()}`);
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// Authenticate with Emby using a stable DeviceId derived from the username.
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// Using a deterministic DeviceId causes Emby to reuse the existing session
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// for this device rather than creating a new one on each login.
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const stableDeviceId = 'sofarr-' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(username.trim().toLowerCase()).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
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const authResponse = await axios.post(`${EMBY_URL}/Users/authenticatebyname`, {
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Username: username.trim(),
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Pw: password
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}, {
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headers: {
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'X-Emby-Authorization': `MediaBrowser Client="sofarr", Device="sofarr", DeviceId="${stableDeviceId}", Version="1.0.0"`
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}
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});
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const authData = authResponse.data;
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// Get user info using the access token
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const userResponse = await axios.get(`${EMBY_URL}/Users/${authData.User.Id || authData.User.id}`, {
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headers: {
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'X-MediaBrowser-Token': authData.AccessToken
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}
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});
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const user = userResponse.data;
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const isAdmin = !!(user.Policy && user.Policy.IsAdministrator);
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console.log(`[Auth] Login successful for user: ${user.Name}, isAdmin: ${isAdmin}`);
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// Store token server-side; it is never sent to the client.
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storeToken(user.Id, authData.AccessToken);
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// Set authentication cookie (signed when COOKIE_SECRET is set).
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// rememberMe=true → persistent cookie, expires in 30 days
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// rememberMe=false → session cookie, expires when browser closes
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// secure is always true — the app should sit behind HTTPS in production;
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// behind a reverse proxy set TRUST_PROXY=1 so req.secure works correctly.
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const cookiePayload = JSON.stringify({ id: user.Id, name: user.Name, isAdmin });
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const signed = !!process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
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const cookieOptions = {
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'strict',
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signed,
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path: '/'
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};
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if (rememberMe) {
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cookieOptions.maxAge = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days
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}
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res.cookie('emby_user', cookiePayload, cookieOptions);
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// Issue a CSRF token tied to this session so state-changing endpoints
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// can validate the double-submit cookie pattern
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const csrfToken = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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res.cookie('csrf_token', csrfToken, {
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httpOnly: false, // intentionally readable by JS for the double-submit pattern
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'strict',
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path: '/'
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});
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res.json({
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success: true,
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user: { id: user.Id, name: user.Name, isAdmin },
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csrfToken
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});
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} catch (error) {
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console.error(`[Auth] Login failed:`, error.message);
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res.status(401).json({
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success: false,
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error: 'Invalid username or password'
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});
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}
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});
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function parseSessionCookie(req) {
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const signed = !!process.env.COOKIE_SECRET;
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const raw = signed ? req.signedCookies.emby_user : req.cookies.emby_user;
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if (!raw || raw === false) return null; // false = tampered signed cookie
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try {
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const u = JSON.parse(raw);
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// Schema validation: require id (string), name (string), isAdmin (boolean)
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if (typeof u.id !== 'string' || !u.id) return null;
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if (typeof u.name !== 'string' || !u.name) return null;
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if (typeof u.isAdmin !== 'boolean') u.isAdmin = !!u.isAdmin;
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return u;
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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// Get current authenticated user
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router.get('/me', (req, res) => {
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const user = parseSessionCookie(req);
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if (!user) return res.json({ authenticated: false });
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res.json({
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authenticated: true,
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user: { id: user.id, name: user.name, isAdmin: user.isAdmin }
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});
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});
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// CSRF token refresh — lets the SPA get a new token without re-logging-in
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// (e.g. after a page reload where the JS variable was lost)
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router.get('/csrf', (req, res) => {
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const csrfToken = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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res.cookie('csrf_token', csrfToken, {
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httpOnly: false,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'strict',
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path: '/'
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});
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res.json({ csrfToken });
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});
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// Logout
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router.post('/logout', async (req, res) => {
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const user = parseSessionCookie(req);
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if (user) {
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const stored = getToken(user.id);
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if (stored) {
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try {
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await axios.post(`${EMBY_URL}/Sessions/Logout`, {}, {
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headers: { 'X-MediaBrowser-Token': stored.accessToken }
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});
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console.log(`[Auth] Revoked Emby token for user: ${user.name}`);
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} catch (err) {
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console.warn(`[Auth] Failed to revoke Emby token for ${user.name}:`, err.message);
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}
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clearToken(user.id);
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}
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}
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res.clearCookie('emby_user', {
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'strict',
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signed: !!process.env.COOKIE_SECRET,
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path: '/'
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});
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res.clearCookie('csrf_token', {
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httpOnly: false,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'strict',
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path: '/'
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});
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res.json({ success: true });
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});
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module.exports = router;
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