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sofarr/SECURITY.md
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docs: final 1.0.0 documentation pass
README.md:
- Node prerequisite: v12+ → v22+
- Real-Time Updates: describe SSE push, remove polling/refresh-selector wording
- On-demand mode: update for SSE connect triggering poll
- API Endpoints: add /stream, /me, /csrf, /user-summary, /status, /cover-art
- Remove stale /api/qbittorrent proxy entry
- Docker tags: update to 1.0.x

SECURITY.md:
- Supported versions: add 1.0.x, retire 0.2.x
- CSP header: add style-src-attr 'unsafe-inline'
- Nginx example: add proxy_buffering off / proxy_read_timeout for SSE

Diagrams:
- seq-dashboard.puml: rewrite as SSE stream sequence (connect,
  initial payload, pushed updates, heartbeat, disconnect)
- seq-polling.puml: add SSE subscriber notification step after
  cache population
- state-ui.puml: replace Refresh Rate sub-state with SSE Connection
  state machine; update splash loading and logout transitions
- state-poller.puml: add Notifying SSE subscribers step in Polling state

package.json: bump to 1.0.0
2026-05-17 09:19:35 +01:00

5.2 KiB

Security Policy & Hardening Guide

Supported Versions

Version Supported
1.0.x Yes
0.2.x No
0.1.x No

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities. Email: gordon@i3omb.com — expect acknowledgement within 48 hours.


Threat Model

sofarr is a personal dashboard intended for a small trusted group (household/team). It proxies requests to *arr stack services using stored API keys and authenticates users via Emby. The primary threat surface when exposed to the public internet:

Threat Mitigations
Credential brute-force Rate limiting (10 fails/15 min per IP), account lockout window
Session hijacking HMAC-signed cookies, httpOnly, secure, sameSite=strict, short TTL
CSRF Double-submit cookie pattern (X-CSRF-Token header required on all mutations)
API key leakage via errors sanitizeError() redacts keys/tokens from all error responses and logs
Token theft after logout Server-side token store; Emby token revoked on logout
XSS → token theft httpOnly cookies; CSP with per-request nonce blocks inline injection
Clickjacking X-Frame-Options: DENY + CSP frame-ancestors 'none'
Info disclosure via headers Helmet v7 removes X-Powered-By, sets noSniff, xssFilter, etc.
Privilege escalation (container) Non-root user (UID 1000), no-new-privileges, all caps dropped
Unbounded log growth Size-based rotation: 10 MB cap, 3 rotated files kept
Dependency vulnerabilities npm audit --audit-level=high in CI on every push

Production Deployment Checklist

Required

  • COOKIE_SECRET set to a random 32-byte hex string (openssl rand -hex 32)
  • NODE_ENV=production
  • TRUST_PROXY=1 set if behind a reverse proxy
  • sofarr bound to 127.0.0.1 only (not 0.0.0.0) — expose via proxy
  • HTTPS enforced by the reverse proxy with a valid certificate
  • Firewall rules: only 443/80 open externally; 3001 not directly exposed
  • Reverse proxy: Nginx, Caddy, or Traefik with TLS termination
  • Set Strict-Transport-Security at proxy level (sofarr also sends HSTS)
  • DATA_DIR on a named Docker volume (not bind-mounted to sensitive host path)
  • Rotate COOKIE_SECRET periodically (causes all users to re-login)
  • Enable Docker's --read-only flag (already in docker-compose.yaml)
  • Monitor /health endpoint with an uptime checker

Docker Secrets (alternative to env vars)

For production environments that support Docker secrets, you can mount secret files and reference them:

secrets:
  cookie_secret:
    file: ./secrets/cookie_secret.txt
  emby_api_key:
    file: ./secrets/emby_api_key.txt

services:
  sofarr:
    secrets:
      - cookie_secret
      - emby_api_key
    environment:
      - COOKIE_SECRET_FILE=/run/secrets/cookie_secret
      - EMBY_API_KEY_FILE=/run/secrets/emby_api_key

Note: File-based secret loading requires application code support. Currently sofarr reads secrets from environment variables only. Mounting secrets as env vars (via environment: in compose) is the current supported approach.


Reverse Proxy Example (Caddy)

sofarr.example.com {
    reverse_proxy localhost:3001
    header {
        Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
        X-Robots-Tag "noindex, nofollow"
    }
}

Reverse Proxy Example (Nginx)

server {
    listen 443 ssl;
    server_name sofarr.example.com;

    ssl_certificate     /etc/letsencrypt/live/sofarr.example.com/fullchain.pem;
    ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/sofarr.example.com/privkey.pem;

    location / {
        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3001;
        proxy_set_header Host $host;
        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;

        # Required for SSE (Server-Sent Events) — disable response buffering
        proxy_buffering off;
        proxy_cache off;
        proxy_read_timeout 3600s;
    }
}

Security Headers (emitted by sofarr)

Header Value
Content-Security-Policy default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-…'; style-src 'self' 'nonce-…'; style-src-attr 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'
Strict-Transport-Security max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload (production only)
X-Content-Type-Options nosniff
X-Frame-Options DENY
Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Permissions-Policy camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()

Rate Limits

Endpoint Limit
POST /api/auth/login 10 failed attempts per 15 min per IP
All /api/* routes 300 requests per 15 min per IP

Supply Chain

  • All dependencies pinned to minor version ranges in package.json
  • npm audit --audit-level=high runs in CI on every push and pull request
  • npm audit fix should be run when vulnerabilities are reported