Commit Graph

10 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
5fd55b4e1a test: add comprehensive test suite (115 tests, Vitest + supertest + nock)
Some checks failed
Build and Push Docker Image / build (push) Successful in 49s
CI / Security audit (push) Successful in 1m23s
CI / Tests & coverage (push) Failing after 2m13s
Framework:
- Vitest v4 as test runner (fast ESM/CJS support, V8 coverage built-in)
- supertest for integration tests against createApp() factory
- nock for HTTP interception (works with CJS require('axios'), unlike vi.mock)

New files:
- vitest.config.js          — test config: node env, isolate, V8 coverage, per-file thresholds
- tests/setup.js             — isolated DATA_DIR per worker, SKIP_RATE_LIMIT, console suppression
- tests/README.md            — approach, structure, design decisions
- server/app.js              — testable Express factory (extracted from index.js side-effects)

Unit tests (91 tests):
- tests/unit/sanitizeError.test.js  — secret redaction: apikey, token, bearer, basic-auth URLs
- tests/unit/config.test.js         — JSON array + legacy single-instance config parsing
- tests/unit/requireAuth.test.js    — valid/invalid/tampered cookies, schema validation
- tests/unit/verifyCsrf.test.js     — double-submit pattern, timing-safe compare, safe methods
- tests/unit/qbittorrent.test.js    — formatBytes, formatEta, mapTorrentToDownload state map
- tests/unit/tokenStore.test.js     — store/get/clear lifecycle, TTL expiry, atomic disk write

Integration tests (24 tests):
- tests/integration/health.test.js  — /health and /ready endpoints
- tests/integration/auth.test.js    — full login/logout/me/csrf flows, input validation,
                                      cookie attributes, no token leakage, Emby mock via nock

Production code changes (minimal, no behaviour change):
- server/routes/auth.js: EMBY_URL captured at request-time (not module load) for testability
- server/routes/auth.js: loginLimiter max → Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER when SKIP_RATE_LIMIT set
- server/utils/sanitizeError.js: fix HEADER_PATTERN to redact full line (not just first token)

CI:
- .gitea/workflows/ci.yml: add parallel 'test' job (npm run test:coverage, artifact upload)
- package.json: add test/test:watch/test:coverage/test:ui scripts
- .gitignore: add coverage/
2026-05-17 07:45:33 +01:00
bdbbcabfbc feat(security): production hardening for external deployment
All checks were successful
Build and Push Docker Image / build (push) Successful in 1m2s
CI / Security audit (push) Successful in 3m29s
Container (Dockerfile):
- Multi-stage build (deps + runtime) for minimal attack surface
- Upgrade base image from node:18-alpine to node:22-alpine
- Run as non-root 'node' user (UID 1000); source files owned by root
- /app/data directory owned by node for SQLite + logs
- Docker HEALTHCHECK: wget /health every 30s

docker-compose.yaml:
- Port bound to 127.0.0.1 only (expose via reverse proxy)
- read_only: true filesystem; /tmp tmpfs for Node.js
- no-new-privileges:true, cap_drop: ALL
- Named volume sofarr-data for persistent data
- TRUST_PROXY, COOKIE_SECRET, NODE_ENV added

Helmet v7 + CSP nonce:
- Upgrade helmet@4 → helmet@7, express-rate-limit@6 → @7
- CSP with per-request nonce injected into index.html script/link tags
  (replaces blanket unsafe-inline; nonce changes every request)
- HSTS: max-age=1yr, includeSubDomains, preload
- Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
- Permissions-Policy: camera/mic/geolocation/payment/usb all off
- index.html served dynamically with nonce injection; static assets
  served normally via express.static({index:false})

Trust proxy:
- TRUST_PROXY env var configures app.set('trust proxy') so rate
  limiting and secure cookies work correctly behind Nginx/Caddy

Session & auth:
- Token store migrated from in-memory Map to SQLite via better-sqlite3
  (server/utils/tokenStore.js): survives restarts, WAL mode, 31-day TTL
- CSRF double-submit cookie pattern (server/middleware/verifyCsrf.js):
  POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE on /api/* require X-CSRF-Token header matching
  the csrf_token cookie; timing-safe comparison
- CSRF token issued on login + GET /api/auth/csrf; cleared on logout
- Login input validation: username/password length + type checked before
  hitting Emby
- skipSuccessfulRequests:true on login rate limiter (only count failures)
- express.json({ limit: '64kb' }) to reject oversized payloads

Rate limiting:
- General API limiter: 300 req/15min per IP on all /api/* routes
- Login limiter unchanged (10 failures/15min) but now only counts fails

Logging:
- Log file moved from /app/server.log to DATA_DIR/server.log (writable
  by non-root node user in container)
- Size-based rotation: rotate at 10 MB, keep 3 files (server.log.1-3)
- DATA_DIR defaults to ./data locally, /app/data in container

Error handling:
- Global Express error handler: catches unhandled errors, logs message,
  returns generic 500 (no stack traces to clients)

Health/readiness:
- GET /health: returns {status:'ok', uptime:N} — used by HEALTHCHECK
- GET /ready: returns 503 if EMBY_URL not configured

Error sanitization (sanitizeError.js):
- Added patterns for password= params, bearer tokens, Basic auth in URLs

Supply chain:
- Remove unused cors dependency
- add better-sqlite3@^9
- CI: upgrade to Node 22, raise audit level to --audit-level=high
- .gitignore: add data/, *.db, *.db-wal, *.db-shm

Docs:
- SECURITY.md: threat model, hardening checklist, proxy examples,
  header table, rate limit table, Docker secrets guidance
- .env.example + .env.sample: TRUST_PROXY, DATA_DIR documented
2026-05-17 06:47:25 +01:00
e83afde5ef feat: add 'Keep me logged in' checkbox to login form
Some checks failed
Build and Push Docker Image / build (push) Successful in 26s
CI / npm audit (push) Has been cancelled
- index.html: checkbox between password field and login button
- app.js: reads #remember-me and passes rememberMe in POST body
- auth.js: rememberMe=true sets 30-day maxAge; false = session cookie
  (expires when browser closes)
- style.css: .form-group--checkbox and .checkbox-label styles
2026-05-16 17:15:28 +01:00
bdfb042527 fix(security #13,#14): revoke Emby token on logout; stable DeviceId prevents unbounded sessions
#13 Logout doesn't revoke Emby token:
  - Added in-memory tokenStore (userId -> { accessToken })
  - AccessToken stored server-side after successful login; never sent
    to client
  - POST /logout calls Emby POST /Sessions/Logout with the stored
    token before clearing it; failure is warned but does not block
    the local cookie clear

#14 Unbounded Emby session creation per login:
  - DeviceId in the Emby auth request is now a stable SHA-256 hash
    of the lowercase username (sofarr-<16 hex chars>)
  - Emby treats the same DeviceId as the same device and reuses the
    existing session slot instead of creating a new one each login
2026-05-16 16:25:05 +01:00
d8584d0511 fix(security #7,#8,#9): signed cookies, isAdmin tamper-proof, schema validation
#7 isAdmin trusted from unsigned cookie:
  - isAdmin is derived server-side from Emby Policy at login time
  - Cookie is now signed (HMAC) when COOKIE_SECRET env var is set;
    Express rejects tampered signatures (signedCookies returns false)
  - dashboard.js /user-downloads and /status now use requireAuth
    middleware (req.user) instead of re-parsing cookie directly

#8 cookie-parser used without signing secret:
  - cookieParser(COOKIE_SECRET) in index.js when env var is set
  - Hard-fails at startup in production if COOKIE_SECRET unset
  - Warns in development

#9 Cookie JSON parsed without schema validation:
  - parseSessionCookie() in auth.js and requireAuth.js both validate:
    id (non-empty string), name (non-empty string), isAdmin (boolean)
  - Invalid/tampered cookies return null / 401 respectively
2026-05-16 16:20:37 +01:00
1eadb30481 fix(security #6): add rate limiting to POST /api/auth/login
Uses express-rate-limit@6 (pinned for Node 12 dev compat; Node 18
in prod container is unaffected). Limits each IP to 10 attempts per
15-minute window. Returns 429 with a safe error message on breach.
2026-05-16 16:18:34 +01:00
8f96a5f296 fix(security #5): remove plaintext logging of Emby auth response and user object
The full authResponse.data (containing AccessToken) and user object
were being logged via console.log → written to server.log on disk.
Replaced with a single safe log line showing only name and isAdmin.
2026-05-16 16:17:43 +01:00
83049786eb security: fix issues #1-4 from security audit
All checks were successful
Build and Push Docker Image / build (push) Successful in 39s
#1 Session cookie: add secure (production-only) and sameSite=strict
    to prevent transmission over HTTP and cross-site request abuse.
#2 Remove Emby AccessToken from cookie payload — it was stored in
    the browser cookie but is never needed client-side; reduces blast
    radius if cookie is ever exposed.
#3 Add requireAuth middleware to all proxy routes (/api/emby,
    /api/sabnzbd, /api/sonarr, /api/radarr) — previously unauthenticated,
    now require a valid emby_user session cookie.
#4 Remove open CORS wildcard (cors() with no options). The frontend
    is served from the same origin so no CORS headers are required.
    Also update clearCookie() to include matching cookie options.
2026-05-16 15:07:50 +01:00
0957f83411 feat: admin users can view all downloads with user badges
- Admin users (Emby IsAdministrator) see a 'Show all users' toggle
- When toggled, all tagged downloads are shown regardless of user
- Each download card shows the tagged user's name as a badge
- Non-admin users see only their own downloads (unchanged behavior)
- Backend accepts ?showAll=true query param (admin-only)
2026-05-15 20:46:56 +01:00
f500f4db3b feat: fix download-to-user matching, add cover art to downloads
- Fix seriesMap key (use Sonarr internal id, not tvdbId)
- Fix Sonarr tag resolution (use tag map like Radarr)
- Use sourceTitle for history record matching
- Fall back to embedded movie/series objects when API timeouts
- Add includeMovie/includeSeries params to queue/history API calls
- Add coverArt field to all download responses (TMDB poster URLs)
- Add cover art display to frontend download cards
- Fix user-summary route to use instance config and tag maps
2026-05-15 14:54:21 +01:00