3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Gronod	c0dd93a1ab	feat: production hardening v1.2.0 ... Phase 1 - Licensing & Compliance: - Add MIT LICENSE file - Add copyright headers to server/index.js, poller.js, config.js, sanitizeError.js, and new loadSecrets.js Phase 2 - Security Hardening: - Add server/utils/loadSecrets.js: Docker secrets support via _FILE env var pattern (COOKIE_SECRET_FILE, EMBY_API_KEY_FILE, etc.) - Add SSRF/URL validation in config.js: validates all configured service instance URLs for scheme and well-formedness at startup - Add SIGTERM/SIGINT graceful shutdown: stops poller, drains HTTP connections, 10s force-exit fallback - Warn at startup if COOKIE_SECRET is shorter than 32 characters - Validate EMBY_URL scheme at startup - Improve sanitizeError: redact host:port from axios error URLs while preserving path/query for other redaction patterns Phase 3 - Config Robustness: - Weak COOKIE_SECRET warning (< 32 chars) - EMBY_URL validated via validateInstanceUrl on startup Phase 4 - Docker & Deployment: - .dockerignore: add tests/, coverage/, vitest.config.js, CHANGELOG.md, SECURITY.md, LICENSE, .markdownlint.json - docker-compose.yaml: add commented Option B (Docker secrets _FILE pattern) alongside existing plain-env Option A Phase 5 - Docs & Release Readiness: - Add CHANGELOG.md with entries from v1.0.0 to v1.2.0 - Update SECURITY.md: supported versions table, fix Docker secrets note to reflect _FILE support now implemented - Add public/.well-known/security.txt for responsible disclosure - Bump version to 1.2.0	2026-05-17 19:40:07 +01:00
Gronod	dcf613446e	docs: final 1.0.0 documentation pass ... README.md: - Node prerequisite: v12+ → v22+ - Real-Time Updates: describe SSE push, remove polling/refresh-selector wording - On-demand mode: update for SSE connect triggering poll - API Endpoints: add /stream, /me, /csrf, /user-summary, /status, /cover-art - Remove stale /api/qbittorrent proxy entry - Docker tags: update to 1.0.x SECURITY.md: - Supported versions: add 1.0.x, retire 0.2.x - CSP header: add style-src-attr 'unsafe-inline' - Nginx example: add proxy_buffering off / proxy_read_timeout for SSE Diagrams: - seq-dashboard.puml: rewrite as SSE stream sequence (connect, initial payload, pushed updates, heartbeat, disconnect) - seq-polling.puml: add SSE subscriber notification step after cache population - state-ui.puml: replace Refresh Rate sub-state with SSE Connection state machine; update splash loading and logout transitions - state-poller.puml: add Notifying SSE subscribers step in Polling state package.json: bump to 1.0.0	2026-05-17 09:19:35 +01:00
Gronod	bdbbcabfbc	feat(security): production hardening for external deployment ... Container (Dockerfile): - Multi-stage build (deps + runtime) for minimal attack surface - Upgrade base image from node:18-alpine to node:22-alpine - Run as non-root 'node' user (UID 1000); source files owned by root - /app/data directory owned by node for SQLite + logs - Docker HEALTHCHECK: wget /health every 30s docker-compose.yaml: - Port bound to 127.0.0.1 only (expose via reverse proxy) - read_only: true filesystem; /tmp tmpfs for Node.js - no-new-privileges:true, cap_drop: ALL - Named volume sofarr-data for persistent data - TRUST_PROXY, COOKIE_SECRET, NODE_ENV added Helmet v7 + CSP nonce: - Upgrade helmet@4 → helmet@7, express-rate-limit@6 → @7 - CSP with per-request nonce injected into index.html script/link tags (replaces blanket unsafe-inline; nonce changes every request) - HSTS: max-age=1yr, includeSubDomains, preload - Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin - Permissions-Policy: camera/mic/geolocation/payment/usb all off - index.html served dynamically with nonce injection; static assets served normally via express.static({index:false}) Trust proxy: - TRUST_PROXY env var configures app.set('trust proxy') so rate limiting and secure cookies work correctly behind Nginx/Caddy Session & auth: - Token store migrated from in-memory Map to SQLite via better-sqlite3 (server/utils/tokenStore.js): survives restarts, WAL mode, 31-day TTL - CSRF double-submit cookie pattern (server/middleware/verifyCsrf.js): POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE on /api/* require X-CSRF-Token header matching the csrf_token cookie; timing-safe comparison - CSRF token issued on login + GET /api/auth/csrf; cleared on logout - Login input validation: username/password length + type checked before hitting Emby - skipSuccessfulRequests:true on login rate limiter (only count failures) - express.json({ limit: '64kb' }) to reject oversized payloads Rate limiting: - General API limiter: 300 req/15min per IP on all /api/* routes - Login limiter unchanged (10 failures/15min) but now only counts fails Logging: - Log file moved from /app/server.log to DATA_DIR/server.log (writable by non-root node user in container) - Size-based rotation: rotate at 10 MB, keep 3 files (server.log.1-3) - DATA_DIR defaults to ./data locally, /app/data in container Error handling: - Global Express error handler: catches unhandled errors, logs message, returns generic 500 (no stack traces to clients) Health/readiness: - GET /health: returns {status:'ok', uptime:N} — used by HEALTHCHECK - GET /ready: returns 503 if EMBY_URL not configured Error sanitization (sanitizeError.js): - Added patterns for password= params, bearer tokens, Basic auth in URLs Supply chain: - Remove unused cors dependency - add better-sqlite3@^9 - CI: upgrade to Node 22, raise audit level to --audit-level=high - .gitignore: add data/, *.db, *.db-wal, *.db-shm Docs: - SECURITY.md: threat model, hardening checklist, proxy examples, header table, rate limit table, Docker secrets guidance - .env.example + .env.sample: TRUST_PROXY, DATA_DIR documented	2026-05-17 06:47:25 +01:00