chore: bump version to 1.7.13 and update CHANGELOG
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This commit is contained in:
2026-05-24 19:24:01 +01:00
parent 95e301ef56
commit 76631cd37e
9 changed files with 53 additions and 17 deletions
+2 -2
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@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ Each instance receives an `id` derived from `name` (or index if unnamed), used a
| Concern | Mechanism |
|---------|-----------|
| **Secret validation** | Every webhook request must carry `X-Sofarr-Webhook-Secret` matching `SOFARR_WEBHOOK_SECRET`. Absent or wrong secret → `401`. Webhook endpoints function outside the CSRF middleware (they are not browser-initiated). |
| **Rate limiting** | Dedicated `webhookLimiter`: 60 req/min per IP (stricter than the general 300 req/15 min limiter). |
| **Rate limiting** | Dedicated `webhookLimiter`: 60 req/min per IP (stricter than the general 300 req/15 min limiter). Bypassed in testing/dev via `SKIP_RATE_LIMIT=1`. |
| **Payload validation** | `validatePayload()` enforces: JSON object body, `eventType` as a non-empty string ≤ 64 chars, `eventType` in the allowlist, `instanceName` as string if present. Rejects with `400` on any violation. |
| **Replay protection** | `isReplay()` caches a composite key `{eventType}:{instanceName}:{date}` for 5 minutes. Duplicate events within that window are acknowledged with `200 { received: true, duplicate: true }` and not processed. |
@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@ Each instance receives an `id` derived from `name` (or index if unnamed), used a
| Concern | Mechanism |
|---------|-----------|
| **Rate limiting** | 300 req/15 min general (all API routes); 10 failed attempts/15 min login limiter; 60 req/1 min webhook limiter. |
| **Rate limiting** | General API limiter (300 req/15 min on `/api/*` prefix) exempts `/api/dashboard/cover-art` requests; Login limiter (10 attempts/15 min) employs `skipSuccessfulRequests: true` to count failed attempts only; Webhook limiter runs 60 req/1 min on `/api/webhook/*` endpoints; Root `/health` and `/ready` probes are entirely exempt. All limiters bypassable in testing via `SKIP_RATE_LIMIT=1` or `createApp({ skipRateLimits: true })`. |
| **Secret leakage** | `sanitizeError()` (`server/utils/sanitizeError.js`) redacts secrets from error messages and logs: URL query-param secrets (`apikey=`, `token=`), HTTP auth headers (`Authorization:`, `X-Emby-Authorization:`), Bearer tokens, and basic-auth credentials in URLs. |
| **HTTP headers** | Helmet v7: CSP with per-request nonce (`crypto.randomBytes(16)` for inline styles/scripts), HSTS, `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`. |
| **Body size** | `express.json` body limit: 64 KB. |